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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JOSEPH BRADBURY,
Appellant,
Case No. 20010839-CA
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION OF
WILDLIFE RESOURCES,
Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES

JURISDICTION
This petition for review is taken from a final agency action of the Utah
Wildlife Board administratively suspending Appellant's big game hunting
privileges for a period of five years pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 (1998)
and Utah Admin. Code R657-26 (1999). The Utah Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1) (1997) and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the Utah Wildlife Board correctly interpreted the statutory

definition of "resident" found in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) (1998).

-1-

Standard of review: Typically, the standard of review under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (1997) for an agency's interpretation of statute is a
correction-of-error standard. Uintah Oil Assoc, v. County Board of Equalization of
Uintah County. 853 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1993). Nevertheless, the Legislature
often grants agencies explicit or implicit discretion in dealing with statutory terms.
Morton Int'l. Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d
581, 587-88 (Utah 1991). In such instances, an agency's interpretation of a
statute is granted deference by the reviewing court. kL Agency discretion in
interpreting statute may be implied where the statutory language suggests the
Legislature left the question at issue unresolved, or where "there is more than
one permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory language or
legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another." jcL What constitutes
a "resident" as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) is subject to varying
interpretations, and the Utah Wildlife Board is statutorily granted broad policy
making authority in Utah Code Ann. §§ 23-14-3 (1998) and 23-14-18 (1998).
Accordingly, the Utah Wildlife Board's interpretation of "resident" should be
granted deference by this Court.
2.

Whether the Utah Wildlife Board correctly admitted and considered

evidence at the hearing in harmony with the administrative Notice of Agency
Action and the Division of Wildlife Resources' hearing officer's decision.

-2-

Standard of review: Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(e) (1997), an
agency's compliance with prescribed procedures is a question of law and
reviewed for correctness with no deference afforded the agency. Whitear v.
Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); Krantz v. Utah Dep't
of Commerce, 856 P.2d 369, 370 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
3.

Whether the Utah Wildlife Board's factual findings of flagrant and

knowing conduct are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.
Standard of review: Under Title 63, Chapter 46b of the Utah Code,
administrative findings of fact should be affirmed where they are "supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the court."
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah 1989). Substantial
evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence but more than a mere
scintilla. |a\ "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." j d
4.

Whether the Utah Wildlife Board properly considered Appellant's

facially valid guilty plea to and criminal conviction of Wanton Destruction of
Protected Wildlife.
Standard of review: The standard of review under Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(4) (1997) for an agency's application or interpretation of the law is a
correction-of-error standard. Uintah Oil Assoc. 853 P.2d at 896; Morton. 814
P.2d at 588.
-3-

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS1
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(12)(a) (1998).

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(24) (1998).

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) (1998).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 (1998).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 (1998).

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (1998).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(2) (1997).

8.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1997).

9.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (1995).

10.

Utah Administrative Code R657-26-2(2)(b) (1999).

11.

Utah Administrative Code R657-26-8 (1999).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 29, 2000, the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources ("Division")
mailed Notice of Agency Action to Appellant commencing an administrative
license suspension proceeding pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 (1998) and
Utah Admin. Code R657-26 (1999). (R. 55 and Addendum C). An informal
administrative hearing was held pursuant to the Notice of Agency Action on
November 29, 2000 wherein the Division hearing officer heard evidence from

1

The statutes and rules listed in this section are included in the
Addendum.
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Appellant and the Division. (R. 18). After hearing the evidence and legal
argument, the hearing officer concluded Appellant "flagrantly and knowingly"
killed a bull elk with an invalid license, and the hearing officer suspended his big
game hunting privileges for a period of five years. (R. 18).
On January 25, 2001, Appellant appealed the hearing officer's decision to
the Utah Wildlife Board ("Wildlife Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 23-199(12) and Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8. (R. 11). The Wildlife Board
subsequently held a de novo, formal administrative hearing on May 17, 2001
pursuant to Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8(5) to consider the matter of Appellant's
hunting license suspension. (R. 1). Both Appellant and the Division offered
evidence and argument at the hearing. (R. 1). On September 26, 2001, the
Wildlife Board issued its written Order affirming the five year suspension of
Appellant's big game hunting privileges. (R. 1 and Addendum C).
Appellant appealed the Wildlife Board's Order to the Utah Court of Appeals
on October 24, 2001 pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(1).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Officer Jack Topham is a certified peace officer employed by the Division
as a criminal investigator. (R. 118 at 20-21). In the Fall of 1998, Officer Topham
received information from a confidential informant that Appellant was domiciled in
Utah and killed a six point bull elk in 1997 using an illegally purchased Utah
nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 21). Officer Topham's
-5-

investigation of this matter and evidence offered in subsequent hearings reveals
the following.
Appellant admits he has lived in Utah since 1976. (R. 118 at 68). At all
relevant times, he has been domiciled in Utah, employed in Utah, registered to
vote in Utah, and taxed in Utah. (R. 118 at 25, 69-70). However, in 1993
Appellant unlawfully obtained an Idaho drivers license using his sister's Idaho
daycare center's address to facilitate an illegal scheme of obtaining resident
Idaho hunting licenses. (R. 118 at 22, 70). In 1997, Appellant applied for and
obtained a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R118 at 23-24, 6769). He falsely listed his sister's Idaho daycare center's address as his, a phone
number with an Idaho area code as his, and an Idaho drivers license number in
his application for the 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R118
at 23-24, 67-69). He ultimately received a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk
license on the Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek unit, and in 1997 he was successful in
killing a mature six point bull elk. (R. 118 at 26, 69). That same year, Appellant
fraudulently obtained a resident Idaho hunting license and was ultimately
convicted in Idaho for that offense, among others, on or about September 23,
1999. (R. 98 and R. 118 at 33, 84-85).
The Uintah County Attorney's Officer filed criminal charges against
Appellant for killing in 1997 the six point bull elk. (R. 118 at 27-28). Appellant
was specifically charged with violating Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4 (1998) by killing
-6-

the bull elk with an illegal and invalid nonresident license obtained in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 (1998). (R. 118 at 28-30, 51). Under Section 23-19-5,
it is unlawful for any person to obtain a license by fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, and it is unlawful for a resident to purchase a nonresident
license.
Appellant pleaded guilty to the charge of Wanton Destruction of Protected
Wildlife (Section 23-20-4), a Class A Misdemeanor, on December 15,1999 in the
Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah. (R. 96). The
factual basis underlying the conviction was Appellant's killing a six point bull elk
on the Book Cliffs limited entry unit with an unlawfully obtained Utah nonresident
license. The nonresident license was deemed invalid and the kill consequently
illegal since Appellant obtained the license by misrepresenting his actual status
as a resident. (R.118 at 52-53). The factual basis supporting the charge was
provided to the court and the plea entered thereto. The court accepted the plea
and concluded it was knowingly made and had a factual basis. (R. 96).
Based on these facts, the Wildlife Board suspended Appellant's big game
hunting privileges for five years, concluding he "flagrantly and knowingly"
obtained a Utah nonresident bull elk license in violation of the law and unlawfully
used it as ostensible authority to kill a bull elk. (R. 1).
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Wildlife Board's legal conclusion that Appellant was a resident of Utah
in 1997 when he purchased a Utah nonresident bull elk license should be
affirmed on the following two grounds. First, Appellant pleaded guilty to the
criminal charge of killing a bull elk with an illegally obtained and invalid license.
The license was invalid since he obtained a Utah nonresident license while a
Utah resident in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5. By pleading guilty,
Appellant effectively admitted all the essential elements of the crime charged and
cannot now attempt to change that admission. Appellant waived whatever rights
he had to challenge his residency or nonresidency status when he pleaded guilty
to unlawfully killing the bull elk. Second, Appellant was legally a resident of Utah
in 1997 when he fraudulently purchased a nonresident bull elk license. For
purposes of obtaining a hunting or fishing license in Utah, a "resident" is a person
who: 1) has been domiciled in the state for six months immediately preceding the
purchase of a license; and 2) does not claim residency in any other state for
purposes of hunting and fishing. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a). The
Legislature has not defined the word "claim," but states elsewhere in Title 23 of
the Utah Code ("Wildlife Code") that fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation may not
be used to obtain a license. The code further states a resident may not purchase
a nonresident license. See Section 23-19-5. Construing "claim" in context with
these Wildlife Code provisions demonstrates the Legislature's intent to exclude
-8-

false or fraudulent claims of residency in another state from forming the basis of
nonresidency. In other words, a person domiciled in Utah cannot legally
purchase a nonresident license solely on a false claim of residency in another
state. To hold otherwise would allow Utah residents to transform into
nonresidents with nothing more than a spurious claim of residency in another
state. The Wildlife Board properly concluded that the "claim of residency in
another state," as used in the definition of "resident," must be a bona fide claim.
In its de novo review of Appellant's five year hunting license suspension,
the Wildlife Board properly considered evidence pertaining to his domicile in
Utah, his unlawful acquisition of an Idaho drivers license for purposes of
fraudulently obtaining resident Idaho hunting licenses, his unlawful purchase of
resident Idaho hunting licenses, his Idaho conviction for purchasing resident
Idaho hunting licenses, and the false information used to unlawfully obtain a Utah
nonresident bull elk license. The evidence is all within the scope of the
administrative Notice of Agency Action and the Division's suspension order under
review. The evidence is further probative of the issue of whether Appellant's
conduct in unlawfully obtaining a Utah nonresident elk license and killing an elk
with it was committed "flagrantly and knowingly," a necessary element under Utah
Code Ann. § 23-19-9(1 )(a) for suspending a hunting license. Appellant's
challenge to the Wildlife Board's authority to conduct a de novo review of the
Division's suspension order was never raised below and cannot now be raised on
-9-

appeal. Nevertheless, the de novo review was within the Wildlife Board's
authority, necessary, and proper.
The Wildlife Board properly found that Appellant's conduct in unlawfully
obtaining a Utah nonresident bull elk license was committed "flagrantly and
knowingly." Appellant deceived the Division and obtained the nonresident license
by intentionally providing a false Idaho address and phone number, listing an
illegal Idaho drivers license number, and fraudulently claiming nonresident status.
Appellant literally stole the opportunity to receive the permit and take a trophy bull
elk from a legitimate nonresident. The fraud was committed knowingly and is
conspicuously bad or offensive to ethical sportsmen that wait years to receive
such licenses. Appellant's assertion that the definition of "knowingly" found in
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) is inconsistent with the criminal culpability
definition of "knowingly" in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (1995) was not raised
at the hearing before the Wildlife Board and is, therefore, waived. Nevertheless,
the Wildlife Board and the Division have the statutory authority and need to define
"knowingly" as used in Section 23-19-9(1 )(a) since the term is not defined in the
Wildlife Code or linked to any other definition in the code. The fact the definition
differs slightly from that in the criminal code does not compromise its validity.
A criminal conviction on a violation of the Wildlife Code is necessary before
an administrative suspension order may be entered against a violator's hunting
privileges. Guilty pleas are criminal convictions and presumed valid unless set
-10-

aside or overturned by a court of competent jurisdiction. Appellant's guilty plea in
the Eighth Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah, to Wanton
Destruction of Protected Wildlife has never been challenged on direct appeal or
collaterally. Any defect in the criminal information upon which Appellant entered
his guilty plea was waived when the plea was entered. Moreover, the Wildlife
Board did not err in considering the conviction since it lacks authority to disregard
or invalidate a facially valid conviction.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE WILDLIFE BOARD'S CONCLUSION THAT APPELLANT WAS A
UTAH RESIDENT AND THAT HE UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED A UTAH
NONRESIDENT BULL ELK LICENSE SHOULD BE SUSTAINED.
Appellant asserts the Wildlife Board erred in its interpretation of the

definition of "resident" found in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a) (1998) when it
concluded he unlawfully obtained a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license
in 1997. Specifically, Appellant challenges the Wildlife Board's conclusion that a
fraudulent or spurious claim of residency in another state is insufficient under the
statutory definition of "resident" to render a person domiciled in the State of Utah
a nonresident for purposes of hunting.

-11-

A.

Appellant Waived the Right to Challenge His Status as a Utah
Resident When He Pleaded Guilty to Wanton Destruction of
Protected Wildlife.

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Wanton Destruction of
Protected Wildlife on December 15, 1999 in the Eighth Judicial District Court for
Uintah County, State of Utah. (R. 96). The factual basis underlying the conviction
was Appellant's killing a six point bull elk on the Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek limited
entry unit with an unlawfully obtained Utah nonresident license. The nonresident
license was deemed void and the kill consequently illegal since Appellant
obtained the license by misrepresenting his actual status as a resident. (R.118 at
52-53).
Appellant pleaded guilty to a criminal charge which had as an element the
killing of a bull elk with an invalid nonresident license. He had the opportunity in
the criminal proceeding to raise the legal defense of being a Utah nonresident by
virtue of his claim of residency in Idaho, but he instead elected to plead guilty to
the offense. "The general rule applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases
are legion, is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all
the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby waives all
nonjurisdictional defects

" State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah

1989). Appellant's status as a "resident" or "nonresident" as defined in Utah
Code Ann. § 23-13-2(24) and (37) is an issue of statutory construction and
cannot be construed as a jurisdictional defect in any circumstance. Appellant

-12-

pleaded guilty and thereafter cannot attempt in an administrative license
suspension proceeding to collaterally attack his plea and the elements of the
offense he admitted. The plea and conviction has never been appealed or
challenged in a court of competent jurisdiction, and Appellant cannot now attempt
to interpret the definition of "resident" different from that which he pleaded guilty
to. (R. 118 at 87-88).
B.

Alternatively. Appellant's Fraudulent Claim of Residency in
Idaho for Purposes of Hunting While Domiciled in Utah is
Legally Insufficient Under Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a)
(1998) to Qualify Him as a Nonresident Hunter in Utah.

Appellant frankly admits that all relevant times, he has been domiciled in
Utah, employed in Utah, registered to vote in Utah, and taxed in Utah. (R. 118 at
25, 68-70). In 1997, however, Appellant applied for and obtained a Utah
nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69). Appellant
listed his sister's Idaho daycare center's address as his, a phone number with an
Idaho area code as his, and an Idaho drivers license number in his application for
the 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69).
He ultimately received a Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license on the
Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek unit, and in 1997 he was successful in killing a mature six
point bull elk. (R. 118 at 26, 69). Appellant's claim of residency in Idaho for
purposes of hunting was fraudulent. (R. 98 and R. 118 at 33, 84-85).

-13-

On the basis of his fraudulent claim of Idaho residency in 1997, Appellant
asserts he was a nonresident hunter in Utah under the definition of "resident"
found in Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(37)(a). Appellant asks this Court to validate
his Utah nonresident limited entry application solely on the basis of the fraud he
perpetrated in Idaho.
"'Resident' means a person who: (i) has been domiciled in the state of
Utah for six consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a license;
and (ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing, or trapping in any other state
or country." ]<± "'Nonresident' means a person who does not qualify as a
resident." See Utah Code Ann. § 23-13-2(24). Appellant maintains the word
"claim," as used in Section 23-13-2(37)(a)(ii), includes not only bona fide claims
of residency in other states but also spurious claims. Such an interpretation,
however, is inconsistent with other sections of Title 23 of the Utah Code and
contrary to the rules of statutory construction.
The primary objective in construing statutory enactments is to give effect to
the Legislature's intent. Lyon v. Burton. 5 P.3d 616, 622 (Utah 2000). "The plain
language of a statute is generally the best indication of that intent." id.
Nevertheless, "[t]he plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and
'with other statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Id. (quoting Roberts
v. Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993)).
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In interpreting the critical words, we follow basic principles of
statutory construction. First, terms of related code provisions should
be construed in a harmonious fashion. Grayson Roper Ltd.
Partnership v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 471-72 (Utah 1989).
Second, statutory terms should be interpreted and applied according
to their commonly accepted meaning unless the ordinary meaning of
the term results in an application that is either "unreasonably
confused, inoperable, [] or in blatant contradiction of the express
purpose of the statute." Morton Int'L Inc. v. Auditing Div. Of the Utah
State Tax Comm'n. 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991).... Third, '"[i]f
there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning or application of the
provisions of an act, it is appropriate to analyze the act in its entirely,
in light of its objective, and to harmonize its provisions in accordance
with its intent and purpose.'" Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P.2d
1037, 1045 (Utah 1991) (quoting Osuala v. Aetna Life and Casualty.
608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980).
State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
The word "claim," as used in Section 23-13-2(37)(a)(ii), is undefined and
subject to varying interpretation as evidenced by this very issue being appealed.
Appellant disregards related code provisions and attempts to construe the word
"claim" in isolation. However, the meaning of a statutory term should not be
determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.
Brixen & Christopher Architects v. State. 29 P.3d 650, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).
Courts should interpret statutory terms as a comprehensive whole and not in a
piecemeal fashion. JdL In construing the word "claim," it must be read and
interpreted in harmony with Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 (1998), which states:
It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license,
permit, tag or certificate of registration by fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. It is unlawful for a nonresident to purchase a
resident license. It is unlawful for a resident to purchase a
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nonresident license. Any person violating provisions of this section
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Appellant's asserted definition of "claim" to include fraudulent and spurious
claims blatantly contradicts and renders inoperable the terms of Section 23-19-5
in two respects.
First, the Utah Legislature has specifically expressed its intent regarding
the issue of residents purchasing nonresident hunting licenses. "It is unlawful for
a resident to purchase a nonresident license." \± It is recognized that the term
"resident," as used in this section, is defined in Section 23-13-2(37)(a) to exclude
persons domiciled in Utah that "claim" residency in another state. Nevertheless,
interpreting "claim" of residency to include patently false claims completely guts
the purpose and intent of Section 23-19-5. If "claim" is interpreted as Appellant
suggests it should, any person domiciled in Utah could transform from resident
into nonresident by simply making a spurious claim of residency in another state
or country. Such an interpretation would render the prohibition against residents
purchasing nonresident licenses found in Section 23-19-5 absolutely meaningless
and unenforceable. Although Appellant acted upon his false claim of residency in
Idaho by fraudulently purchasing a resident Idaho hunting license, his proposed
interpretation of "claim" would not require such action. A mere false claim to
oneself would suffice. The claim of residency described in Section 23-13-2(37)(a)
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must be interpreted and confined to bona fide claims in order to give meaning
and effect to Section 23-19-5.
Second, Section 23-19-5 expressly prohibits any person from obtaining a
license or permit by fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Interpreting "claim" to
include false claims allows a person domiciled in Utah to obtain a nonresident
license by deceitfully claiming residency in another state. But for the deceit, that
person would be ineligible to obtain a Utah nonresident license. Therefore,
Appellant's interpretation of "claim" is in direct conflict with Section 23-19-5 and
inconsistent with the rules of statutory construction.
Construing the definition of "resident" in Section 23-13-2(37)(a) in harmony
with other provisions of Title 23 of the Utah Code and in accord with the rules of
statutory construction requires the interpretation that any claim of residency in
another state or country by a person domiciled in Utah must be actual and bona
fide before a Utah nonresident license may legally be purchased.
II.

THE WILDLIFE BOARD DID NOT ERR IN THE MANNER IT
CONDUCTED THE ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING ON APPEAL OR IN
THE SCOPE OF EVIDENCE CONSIDERED.
Appellant charges the Wildlife Board with a number of procedural

deficiencies in the manner it conducted his administrative hearing on appeal and
in the evidence considered. Specifically, he alleges the Wildlife Board did not
have authority to conduct a de novo review of the Division of Wildlife Resources
administrative order and it considered evidence beyond the scope of the Notice of
-17-

Agency Action. A brief overview of the Division's license suspension process
may be helpful in understanding the issues.
The Division's administrative license suspension proceedings are initiated
with a Notice of Agency Action prepared and served on the licensee as required
in Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-3(2) (1997) and Utah Admin. Code R657-26-3
(1999).2 The licensee may request and receive an informal hearing before the
Division's administrative hearing officer. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5 (1997);
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-4 and 5 (1999). Upon conclusion of the informal
hearing, the hearing officer issues an administrative order stating the decision
with a notice of the right to appeal to the Wildlife Board. See Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-5 (1997); Utah Admin. Code R657-26-6 (1999). The Wildlife Board
considers all license suspension appeals from orders of the Division's
administrative hearing officer by conducting a de novo, formal adjudicative
hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8 (1997) and Utah Admin. Code
R657-26-8 (1999). The Wildlife Board's decision and order may be appealed to
the Utah Court of Appeals for a review of the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-16(1997).

2

Utah Admin. Code R657-26 was amended effective October 17, 2001.
The rule effective during Appellant's administrative license suspension
proceedings before the Division and the Wildlife Board is attached as Addendum
B. All future references to this rule chapter, unless otherwise stated, will refer to
that attached as Addendum B.
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A.

The Wildlife Board's De Novo Review of the Division's Initial
Administrative Order Should be Upheld.
1.

To the Extent Appellant Challenges the Wildlife Board's
Authority to Conduct a De Novo Review of the Division's
Administrative Suspension Order, He Failed to Object to this
Issue Below and has Waived the Right to Appeal it.

"The general rule is that objections or questions not raised or urged in an
agency proceeding are considered waived and will not be considered by a court
on review." Esguivel v. Labor Commission of Utah, 7 P.3d 777, 783 (Utah 2000);
Brown & Root Indus. Service v. Industrial Commission. 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah
1997); Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Commission. 681 P.2d 1244,
1249 (Utah 1984).
At the beginning of the Wildlife Board's May 17, 2001 formal hearing on
Appellant's license suspension appeal, the Board Chairman specifically stated
that the hearing would be formal and conducted pursuant to the Administrative
Procedures Act. (R. 118 at 4). He further stated that both parties would be
afforded the opportunity to present evidence, call witnesses, call rebuttal
witnesses, and cross-examine adverse witnesses. (R. 118 at 5-6). Moreover,
counsel for the Division argued at the hearing on Appellant's objection to the
introduction of certain evidence and in closing argument that the Wildlife Board's
hearing was a de novo review of the Division's administrative hearing officer's
decision. (R. 118 at 78, 98). However, the record is void of any objection by
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Appellant challenging the Wildlife Board's legal authority to conduct a de novo
review of the Division's administrative order. Appellant's failure to raise this issue
before the Wildlife Board at his May 17, 2001 hearing precludes him from now
raising it on appeal.
2.

The Wildlife Board's Review of the Division's Initial
Administrative Order was Appropriately Conducted as a
De Novo Review.

Appellant asserts Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(12)(b) (1998) and Utah
Admin. Code R657-26-8(8) (1999) confine the Wildlife Board's administrative
review of the Division's license suspension proceedings to a review of the record.
However, the two sections simply direct the Wildlife Board to review the basis
underlying the Division's decision to suspend hunting privileges. Nothing in these
sections explicitly dictates the manner of review.
The Division's authority to suspend hunting privileges is found in Utah
Code Ann. §23-19-9 (1998).3 The Wildlife Board is specifically charged with
responsibility in Section 23-19-9(12)(b) to "review the [division] hearing officer's
findings and conclusions and any documentation submitted at the hearing." The
Wildlife Board is further granted authority in Section 23-19-9(13) to "make rules to
implement this section in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative

3

Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9 was amended by the Legislature effective
April 30, 2001. The section effective during Appellant's administrative hearings
and appeals is attached as Addendum A. All future references to this code
section, unless otherwise stated, will refer to that attached as Addendum A.
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Procedures Act." Pursuant to its rule making authority, the Wildlife Board
promulgated a rule designating its review proceedings as formal adjudicative
hearings to be conducted in accordance with the Utah Administrative Procedures
Act. See Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8(5). Although the rule does not
specifically identify the review proceeding as de novo,4 the nature of a formal
hearing envisions, if not necessitates it.
Formal adjudicative proceedings grant the parties the right to present
evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal
evidence. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-8(1). The presiding officer is further
charged to "regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant
facts and to afford all parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions."
kl

The presiding officer may exclude irrelevant or immaterial evidence, shall

exclude privileged evidence, may receive documentary evidence, and may take
official notice of evidence capable of judicial notice under the Utah Rules of
Evidence. JcL Lastly, formal hearings must be recorded to preserve a record for
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, id, A formal adjudicative hearing, as
described in Section 63-46b-8, in no way resembles a review of the record.

4

The amended Utah Admin. Code R657-26, effective October 17, 2001,
codifies the former practice of de novo hearings by specifically stating in R65726-8(5) that Wildlife Board license suspension review proceedings are formal and
de novo.
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Indeed, a transcript of the Division's administrative hearing is not provided to the
Wildlife Board for review at its formal appeal hearing.
This Court in a similar case, Cordova v. Blackstock. 861 P.2d 449 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993), concluded that judicial review of an informal administrative hearing
required a de novo review as opposed to a review of the record. Among the
reasons cited in support of the decision, was the need to prepare a complete
record at the district court level since the next level of appeal went to the Court of
Appeals. JdL at 452. Informal proceedings are less likely to result in an adequate
record. 1<± De novo review of an informal agency proceeding ensures that an
adequate record will be created and further provides an opportunity to correct
deficiencies. Jd "Only then can this state's appellate courts properly review an
informal administrative proceeding." ]cL For the reasons stated in Cordova, the
Wildlife Board must likewise conduct its review of the Division's informal license
suspension proceedings de novo in a formal hearing to prepare an adequate
record for review by the appellate courts of this state.6
B.

The Wildlife Board Did Not Consider Matters Beyond the Scope of
the Notice of Agency Action.

The Notice of Agency Action commencing the Division's informal license
suspension proceeding against Appellant states in part:

5

Judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings is made to the Utah
Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16
(1997).
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The Division alleges that on December 15, 1999, Respondent
pled guilty and was convicted in the Uintah County Justice Court of
violating Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4, a Class A Misdemeanor,
Criminal Case Number 991800274. Respondent shot and killed a
bull elk with a Non-resident Limited Entry Book Cliffs Elk Permit
when he was a resident of Utah.
The purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the
facts underlying the criminal conviction were committed knowingly
and flagrantly.
Under Rule 8(e)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "pleadings shall be
simple, concise, and direct." Technical forms of pleading are not required. |a\
Moreover, "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."
See Rule 8(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "In a notice pleading
jurisdiction like Utah, rule 8(a) 'is to be liberally construed when determining the
sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint.'" Consolidated Reality Group v. Sizzling
Platter. Inc.. 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Gill v. Timm. 720
P.2d 1352, 1353 (Utah 1986)). "The days of strict adherence to draconian
formalities at the pleading stage are over." \jL The fundamental purpose of the
liberalized pleading rules is to afford the opposing party fair notice of the claims
lodged against him and the facts upon which the claims rest. |<± ; Williams v.
State Farm Ins. Co.. 656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). Although the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure may not specifically apply to pleadings in administrative
adjudications, applying a more stringent pleading requirement in less formal
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administrative proceedings than in a formal judicial adjudication is
counterintuitive.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized liberal pleading
requirements in administrative proceedings. "Generally, administrative
pleadings are to be liberally construed...." Pilcher v. State Dept. of Social
Services. 663 P.2d 450, 453 (Utah 1983).
Appellant assets the Wildlife Board erred by allowing the introduction of
and considering evidence regarding his Utah conviction of Wanton Destruction
of Protected Wildlife, Idaho convictions of unlawfully purchasing resident hunting
licenses, acquiring an Idaho drivers license, and listing a false Idaho address
and phone number on his 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry elk license
application. Appellant alleges all these facts are beyond the scope of the Notice
of Agency Action.
The Notice of Agency Action succinctly summarizes its scope in stating;
"[t]he purpose of this proceeding is to determine whether the facts underlying the
criminal conviction were committed knowingly and flagrantly." Appellant's
conviction in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Utah for violating Utah Code
Ann. § 23-20-4 is an essential element prerequisite to suspending his hunting
privileges. See Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(5). The Notice clearly identifies the
Utah criminal conviction as a matter pertinent to the administrative action. The
Notice further identifies the other element necessary before suspension of
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hunting privileges is permitted. The Division must establish that the facts
underlying the criminal conviction were committed "knowingly" and "flagrantly".
See Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(1 )(a).
Appellant maintained in the hearing before the Wildlife Board that his
purchase of a Utah nonresident bull elk license was innocent, that he was not
aware it was illegal. (R. 118 at 42,85). The Division carries the burden of proof
in license suspension proceedings before the Wildlife Board and must establish
the criminal violation was committed "knowingly" and "flagrantly." Moreover,
Appellant's Utah conviction of illegally killing a bull elk in 1997 is premised upon
using an unlawfully obtained and invalid nonresident license. The nonresident
license was obtained in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 which prohibits
using fraud, deceit or misrepresentation in obtaining a license and further enjoins
residents from purchasing nonresident licenses.
Evidence pertaining to Appellant's Idaho convictions of fraudulently
acquiring resident hunting licenses was relevant and necessary to establish that
his claim of residency in that state was spurious. Otherwise, his claim of Idaho
residency would be presumed valid and his purchase of a Utah nonresident
hunting license deemed legal. The evidence further shows a scheme of
deception in both states which goes to the knowing and flagrant requirement.
Evidence pertaining to Appellant's unlawful acquisition of an Idaho drivers
license also shows he was not an Idaho resident. It further shows a scheme to
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defraud both states in obtaining hunting licenses. Appellant frankly admits that
he acquired the Idaho drivers license to facilitate obtaining Idaho resident
hunting licenses. (R. 118 at 70).
Lastly, evidence of Appellant listing a false Idaho address and phone
number on his 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry bull elk license application
strikes right to the heart of his defense. Listing an Idaho address, phone number
and drivers license number on his Utah application supports the conclusion that
Appellant was attempting to avoid raising red flags and conceal from the Division
his true Utah residency status. These acts are inconsistent with Appellant's
testimony that he believed obtaining a nonresident hunting license in Utah was
legitimate. Appellant offered no explanation why he listed a false address and
phone number in violation of Section 23-19-5.
The Wildlife Board did not err in admitting and considering the evidence
complained of by Appellant. The hearing was administrative where relaxed rules
of evidence and procedure apply, the Notice of Agency Action fairly and
adequately put Appellant on notice of the claims lodged against him, and the
evidence was relevant to the issues before the Wildlife Board.
C.

The Wildlife Board Did Not Consider Matters Beyond the Scope of
the Division's Administrative Decision.

Appellant asserts the Wildlife Board erroneously admitted and considered
the evidence discussed in Section II. B. of this Brief since it was outside the
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Division's administrative decision. This assertion is simply inaccurate. The
Division's January 2, 2001 administrative decision suspending Appellant's big
game hunting privileges for a period of five years makes the following findings
and conclusions: 1) Appellant obtained an Idaho drivers license and claimed to
be an Idaho resident for purposes of hunting and fishing; 2) he was domiciled in
Utah; 3) he applied for and obtained in 1997 a Utah nonresident limited entry bull
elk license; 4) he took a six point bull elk in 1997; 5) he was prosecuted and
convicted in Idaho for purchasing resident hunting licenses; and 6) he obtained
the Utah 1997 nonresident limited entry bull elk license by fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation in violation of Section § 23-19-5. (R. 18).
The evidence complained of by Appellant was all referenced in the
Division's January 2, 2001 administrative decision. Furthermore, the evidence
was relevant to the Wildlife Board's decision and properly considered for the
same reasons specified in Section II. B. of this Brief. The Wildlife Board's formal
de novo hearing on the Division's decision reviewed its findings and conclusions
and strictly confined itself to the matters specified therein in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(12)(b) and Utah Admin. Code R657-26-8(8).
III.

THE WILDLIFE BOARD PROPERLY FOUND APPELLANT'S CONDUCT
KNOWING AND FLAGRANT.
Appellant challenges two aspects of the Wildlife Board's determination

that his conduct in unlawfully acquiring a 1997 Utah nonresident limited entry
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bull elk license was knowing and flagrant. First, the Wildlife Board is charged
with error in relying upon the definition of "knowingly" found in Utah Admin. Code
R657-26-2(2)(b) (1999). Second, the Wildlife Board is charged with having
insufficient evidence in the record to conclude Appellant's conduct was knowing
and flagrant.
A.

The Definition of "Knowingly" in Utah Administrative Code R657-262(2)(b) Should be Sustained as Valid.

Appellant correctly notes the definition of "knowingly" in Utah Admin. Code
R657-26-2(2)(b) is not identical to the definition of "knowingly" in the criminal
code, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2) (1995). The assertion that this difference in
definition is reversible error, however, was not raised to the Wildlife Board at
hearing and is substantively without merit in any event.
1.

Appellant Waived the Right to Challenge the Validity of Utah
Administrative Code R657-26-2(2)(b) by Failing to Raise the
Matter at His Hearing with the Wildlife Board.

Appellant's challenge to the definition of "knowingly" found in Utah Admin.
Code R657-26-2(2)(b) was not raised or argued to the Wildlife Board at the
hearing on May 17, 2001. Three references exist in the entire record relating to
this matter: 1) Appellant's Demand for the Return of Personal Property filed with
the Division (R. 37) attaches copies of the relevant code and rule provisions
without discussion or argument (R. 41); 2) the same Demand appearing as an
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Exhibit to the Wildlife Board hearing6 (R. 113, 117); and 3) Appellant's written
Appeal to the Wildlife Board from the Division's January 2, 2001 decision briefly
raises the issue. (R. 13). Nevertheless, the matter is never raised, discussed or
argued to the Wildlife Board at its May 17, 2001 hearing by Appellant or anyone
else.
As stated in Section I of this Brief, "[t]he general rule is that objections or
questions not raised or urged in an agency proceeding are deemed waived and
will not be considered by a court on review." Esquivel. 7 P.3d at 783; Brown &
Root Indus. Service. 947 P.2d at 677; Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales. 681 P.2d at
1249. The fact Appellant challenged the definition of "knowingly" in his written
appeal to the Wildlife Board does not itself entitle him to raise the issue now on
appeal. The Utah Supreme Court in Zions First National Bank v. National
American Title Insurance Company. 749 P.2d 651, 657 (Utah 1988) held that a
defense raised in pleadings but not argued to the trial court is waived on appeal.
"This Court will not consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the
trial court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to
make any findings of fact or law." ]cL (quoting Turtle Management. Inc. v.
Haggis Management. Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)).

6

This document was admitted upon Appellant's request to make all the
Division hearing officer's file an exhibit in the Wildlife Board hearing. (R. 118 at
58). No further discussion took place at the Wildlife Board hearing regarding it.
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Likewise, Appellant's challenge to the definition of "knowingly" found in
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) should not be considered on appeal since it
was not raised at the Wildlife Board hearing on May 17, 2001.
2.

Alternatively, the Definition of "Knowingly" in Utah
Administrative Code R657-26-2(2Vb) is Valid.

Ordinarily, the standard of review under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)
(1997) for an agency's interpretation of statute is a correction-of-error standard.
Uintah Oil Assoc. 853 P.2d at 896. However, the Legislature often grants
agencies explicit or implicit discretion in dealing with statutory terms. Morton.
814 P.2d at 588. In such instances, an agency's interpretation of a statute is
granted deference by the reviewing court, i d Agency discretion in interpreting
a statute may be implied where the statutory language suggests the Legislature
left the question at issue unresolved, or where "there is more than one
permissible reading of the statute and no basis in the statutory language or
legislative history to prefer one interpretation over another." ]g\
The Division and Wildlife Board are granted authority to administratively
suspend or revoke hunting and fishing privileges where a person is convicted of
violating a provision of Title 23 and found to have committed the violation
"flagrantly and knowingly." See Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(1) and (5) (1998).
The terms "flagrantly" and "knowingly" are not defined in Title 23 of the Utah
Code nor are they linked to any other definition in the Utah Code. Specifically,
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the term "knowingly" is not linked or otherwise referenced to the definition found
in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(2). The definition in Section 76-2-103(2)
describes "knowingly" in the context of criminal culpability while Utah Code Ann.
§ 23-19-9(1 )(a) uses the word to articulate an element for administrative license
suspensions. The mere fact the term appears in both contexts does not itself
establish the Legislature's intent for it to share a common definition. Indeed,
there is no evidence in Title 23 of the Utah Code or elsewhere suggesting such
an intent.
Instead, the Legislature manifested its intent in Utah Code Ann. § 23-199(13) for the Wildlife Board to flesh out the procedural and substantive details of
the license suspension process. "The Wildlife Board may make rules to
implement this section in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative
Procedures Act." kL (Emphasis added). "[I]n the absence of a discernable
legislative intent concerning the specific question in issue, a choice among
permissible interpretations of a statute is largely a policy determination." Morton.
814 P.2d at 589. The Wildlife Board's determination to incorporate within the
regulatory definition of "knowingly" an element of criminal negligence is within its
scope of statutory authority granted in Section 23-19-9(13) and not an abuse of
discretion. This point is particularly cogent, considering the definition is used in
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administrative proceedings to temporarily suspend7 recreational hunting and
fishing privileges rather than to impose fines and incarceration. The definition in
Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b) should be granted deference and sustained
since "knowingly" is not defined in Title 23 of the Utah Code and is subject to
varying interpretations. "The agency granted authority to administer the statute
is the appropriate body to make such a determination." id. The Wildlife Board
did not err in adopting and applying the definition of "knowingly" found in Utah
Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b).
B.

The Wildlife Board's Finding that Appellant's Conduct was Knowing
and Flagrant is Supported by Substantial Evidence and Should be
Sustained.

Appellant petitions this Court to set aside the factual findings of the
Wildlife Board as not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he asserts
insufficient evidence was presented at the hearing for the Wildlife Board to
conclude he knowingly and flagrantly8 purchased a Utah nonresident limited

7

The maximum period of time that hunting and fishing privileges may be
suspended is five years. Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-9(8) (1998).
8

"'Flagrantly' means an act in violation of Title 23, Wildlife Resources
Code committed in a manner that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, is
conspicuously bad or offensive." Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(a) (1999).
"'Knowingly' means, with respect to the nature or the result of a person's conduct,
that the person was aware, or should have been aware, that the conduct was
reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Admin. Code R657-26-2(2)(b)
(1999).
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entry bull elk license in 1997 in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5 which
prohibits a Utah resident from purchasing a Utah nonresident license.9 Under
Title 63, Chapter 46b of the Utah Code, administrative findings of fact should be
affirmed where they are "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the court." Grace Drilling Co.. 776 P.2d at 68.
Substantial evidence is something less than the weight of the evidence but more
than a mere scintilla. ]<1 "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." ]g\
Appellant carries the affirmative burden to "marshal all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of
the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the [Wildlife Board's] findings are not
supported by substantial evidence." Nelson v. Department of Employment
Security. 801 P.2d 158, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Appellant fails to marshal the evidence. He identifies two points of
evidence in support of the Wildlife Board's findings and one matter of evidence
contradicting it. The only evidence offered in Appellant's Brief potentially
contradicting the Wildlife Board's findings is his own self-serving statement of

9

Although Appellant pleaded guilty to killing a bull elk in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 23-20-4, Wanton Destruction of Protected Wildlife, the act was
illegal on account of killing the animal with an unlawfully obtained and invalid
nonresident license.
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innocence. Appellant claims he was unaware that purchasing a Utah
nonresident elk license under the circumstances was unlawful.
On the other hand, a plethora of direct and circumstantial evidence
demonstrates Appellant knowingly and flagrantly acquired the 1997 Utah
nonresident license in violation of the law.
a.

Appellant has lived in Utah since 1976. (R. 118 at 68). At all

relevant times, he was domiciled in Utah, employed in Utah, registered to vote in
Utah, and taxed in Utah. (R. 118 at 25, 69-70). Appellant has no bona fide
belief or claim to residency in Idaho or nonresidency in Utah.
b.

Appellant unlawfully obtained an Idaho drivers license in 1993 using

his sister's Idaho daycare center's address to facilitate a scheme for illegally
obtaining resident Idaho hunting licenses. (R. 118 at 22, 70).
c.

Appellant thereafter fraudulently obtained resident hunting licenses

in Idaho. On September 23, 1999, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of
illegally purchasing Idaho resident hunting licenses and was convicted of the
same in the Seventh Judicial District Court of Idaho, Bonneville County. (R. 98
and R. 118 at 33, 84-85). The conviction conclusively demonstrates Appellant's
claim of residency in Idaho for purposes of hunting was fraudulent. The Idaho
drivers license and resident Idaho hunting licenses are evidence of a scheme to
defraud Idaho and, more particularly, Utah.
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d.

In 1997, Appellant applied for and obtained a Utah nonresident

Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek limited entry bull elk license. (R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69).
The application for the license prepared by Appellant identified a false Idaho
address and phone number as his own, and an Idaho drivers license number.
(R. 118 at 23-24, 67-69). Appellant listed the false information in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5, which prohibits using fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation in obtaining a license and in violation of application's
verification clause. (R. 118 at 91-92).

Fraudulently listing an Idaho address,

phone number and drivers license number on his Utah application in violation of
the law supports the conclusion that Appellant was attempting to avoid raising
red flags and conceal from the Division his true Utah residency status. These
acts demonstrate Appellant understood he could not lawfully obtain a Utah
nonresident hunting license.
e.

Appellant pleaded guilty in the Eighth Judicial District Court for

Uintah County, State of Utah on December 15, 1999 to Wanton Destruction of
Protected Wildlife (Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4). (R. 96 and R. 118 at 86-87).
The factual basis underlying the conviction was the killing of a bull elk with an
invalid Utah nonresident license that was obtained through fraud and deceit in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 23-19-5. (R. 118 at 29-30, 52-53). "A plea of
guilty is a confession of the correctness of the accusation which dispenses with
the necessity of proof thereof." State v. Stewart. 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383,
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385 (Utah 1946). Appellant admitted by his guilty plea the elements of Wanton
Destruct of Protected Wildlife, one of which is that the offense was committed
with "intentional, knowing or reckless conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 23-204(1 )(c)(i) (1998).
Appellant's vague, self-serving and predictable defense of ignorance to
violating any laws in Utah or elsewhere by using false information to obtain an
Idaho drivers license, Idaho resident hunting licenses, and a Utah nonresident
hunting license while residing in Utah lacks credibility. (R. 118 at 68-72). The
Wildlife Board had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and judge their
credibility and found the weight of evidence rested against Appellant's assertions
of ignorance and good faith. Considering the administrative record as a whole,
the Wildlife Board's conclusion that Appellant flagrantly and knowingly violated
Section 23-19-5 in obtaining a Utah 1997 nonresident limited entry bull elk
license is supported by substantial evidence.
IV.

APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEA IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, IS VALID AND MAY
NOT BE CHALLENGED IN THIS PETITION FOR REVIEW.
Appellant challenges the validity of his negotiated guilty plea to Wanton

Destruction of Protected Wildlife, Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-4, in the Eighth
Judicial District Court for Uintah County, State of Utah. He asserts the
conviction is invalid because the criminal information misidentifies the actual
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date the offense was committed, and as such, it cannot serve to form the basis
of his hunting license suspension.
Appellant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of Wanton Destruction of
Protected Wildlife on December 15, 1999. (R. 96 and R. 118 at 86-87). The
conviction is facially valid, and Appellant has never attempted to invalidate it on
direct appeal or collaterally. (R. 118 at 87-88).
"Administrative agencies are statutory creatures that have no more power
than that which is expressly or impliedly granted by statute." Nielson v. Division
ofP.O.S.T.. 851 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (citing Williams v. Public
Service Commission. 754 P.2d 41 (Utah 1988)). Appellant's guilty plea is
presumptively valid, State v. Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), and places him legally in the same position as a verdict of a jury finding
him guilty. Stewart. 171 P.2d at 385. Neither the Division nor the Wildlife Board
have statutory authority to invalidate Appellant's plea or to disregard it.
Moreover, Appellant's guilty plea waives any right or opportunity he may
have possessed to challenge any defect in the Information. "The general rule
applicable in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by pleading
guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of
the crime charged and thereby waives all nonjurisdictional defects... ."
Parsons. 781 P.2d at 1278. "When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted
in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he
-37-

may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of
constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea." jd.
Nonmaterial defects in a criminal information, such as the date of the offense,
are nonjurisdictional and may not be raised on appeal where an objection is not
made at the trial level. State v. Marcum. 750 P.2d 599, 601-02 (Utah 1988). "A
[defect] is material if it actually prejudices the accused with respect to a
substantial right, or where the information is so defective that it results in a
miscarriage of justice." ]cL at 601.
Appellant was fully aware when he pleaded guilty that the date of the
charged offense occurred in the Fall of 1997. The investigation focused on one
criminal episode of killing a six point bull elk on the Book Cliffs/Bitter Creek unit
in 1997 with an invalid nonresident license. Appellant pleaded guilty to the
offense, was placed on two years probation, and ordered to pay $ 5610.00 in
restitution. (R. 96-97). Appellant admits he killed a six point bull elk in 1997 in
Utah with a nonresident license. (R. 118 at 69). Moreover, he has never
asserted confusion or prejudice over the substantive elements of the offense he
pleaded guilty to in relation to the offense date specified in the criminal
information. Indeed, Appellant acknowledges that the defective date in the
information was an issue that no one picked up on at the hearing when he
entered his guilty plea. (R. 118 at 50). The defective date in the information did
not substantially prejudice Appellant or result in a miscarriage of justice.
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Accordingly, Appellant waived his right to challenge the information when he
pleaded guilty on December 15, 1999.
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellee does not request oral argument or a published opinion in this case.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the record and the foregoing arguments, Appellee respectfully
requests this Court to affirm the Wildlife Board's September 26, 2001 Order
suspending Appellant's big game hunting privileges for a period of five years.
DATED this > & day of May, 2002.
MARK SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

MARTIN B. BUSHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

GENERAL PROVISIONS

23-13-2

23-13-1. Short title — "Wildlife Resources Code of Utah."
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Wildlife Resources Code of
Utah."
History: C. 1953, 23-13-1, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 1.
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this
act," as used in this section, means L. 1971, ch.
46, which repealed Chapters 1 to 12 and enacted Chapters 13 to 21 and 22 of this title.
Legislative Intent. — Laws 1994, ch. 208,

which amended §§ 23-13-3 and 23-20-25, provides in § 3: "The Legislature finds that wildlife is pervasively regulated for management
and preservation and that the standards articulated in this title are necessary to protect
this resource."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and
Game § 1 et seq.

23-13-2.

C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 1 et seq.; 38
C.J.S. Game § 1 et seq.

Definitions.

As used in this title:
(1) "Activity regulated under this title" means any act, attempted act, or
activity prohibited or regulated under any provision of Title 23 or the
rules, and proclamations promulgated thereunder pertaining to protected
wildlife including:
(a) fishing;
(b) hunting;
(c) trapping;
(d) taking;
(e) permitting any dog, falcon, or other domesticated animal to
take;
(f) transporting;
(g) possessing;
(h) selling;
(i) wasting;
(j) importing;
(k) exporting;
(1) rearing;
(m) keeping;
(n) utilizing as a commercial venture; and
(o) releasing to the wild.
(2) "Aquatic animal" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103.
(3) "Aquatic wildlife" means species of fish, mollusks, crustaceans,
aquatic insects, or amphibians.
(4) "Aquaculture facility" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103.
(5) "Bag limit" means the maximum limit, in number or amount, of
protected wildlife that one person may legally take during one day.
(6) "Big game" means species of hoofed protected wildlife.
(7) "Carcass" means the dead body of an animal or its parts.
(8) "Certificate of registration" means a document issued under this
title, or any rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board granting authority
to engage in activities not covered by a license, permit, or tag.
(9) "Closed season" means the period of time during which the taking of
protected wildlife is prohibited.
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(10) "Conservation officer" means a full-time, permanent employee of
the Division of Wildlife Resources who is POST certified as a peace or a
special function officer.
(11) "Division'5 means the Division of Wildlife Resources.
(12) (a) "Domicile" means the place:
(i) where an individual has a fixed permanent home and
principal establishment;
(ii) to which the individual if absent, intends to return; and
(iii) in which the individual and the individual's family voluntarily reside, not for a special or temporary purpose, but with the
intention of making a permanent home.
(b) To create a new domicile an individual must:
(i) abandon the old domicile; and
(ii) be able to prove that a new domicile has been established.
(13) "Endangered" means wildlife designated as such pursuant to
Section 3 of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973.
(14) "Fee fishing facility" has the meaning provided in Section 4-37-103.
(15) "Feral" means an animal which is normally domesticated but has
reverted to the wild.
(16) "Fishing" means to take fish or crayfish by any means.
(17) "Furbearer" means species of the Bassariscidae, Canidae, Felidae,
Mustelidae, and Castoridae families, except coyote and cougar.
(18) "Game" means wildlife normally pursued, caught, or taken by
sporting means for human use.
(19) (a) "Guide" means a person who receives compensation or advertises services for assisting another person to take protected wildlife.
(b) Assistance under Subsection (a) includes the provision of food,
shelter, or transportation, or any combination of these.
(20) "Guide's agent" means a person who is employed by a guide to
assist another person to take protected wildlife.
(21) "Hunting" means to take or pursue a reptile, amphibian, bird, or
mammal by any means.
(22) "Intimidate or harass" means to physically interfere with or
impede, hinder, or diminish the efforts of an officer in the performance of
the officer's duty.
(23) "License" means the primary document granting authority to
engage in activities under:
(a) this title; or
(b) a rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board.
(24) "Nonresident" means a person who does not qualify as a resident.
(25) "Open season" means the period of time during which protected
wildlife may be legally taken.
(26) "Pecuniary gain" means the acquisition of money or something of
monetary value.
(27) "Permit" means a secondary document, including a stamp, which:
(a) requires a license as a prerequisite to its issuance; and
(b) grants authority to engage in specified activities under this title
or a rule or proclamation of the Wildlife Board.
(28) "Person" means an individual, association, partnership, government agency, corporation, or an agent of the foregoing.
(29) "Possession" means actual or constructive possession.
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(30) "Possession limit" means the number of bag limits one individual
may legally possess.
(31) (a) "Private fish installation" means a body of water where privately owned, protected aquatic wildlife are propagated or kept.
(b) "Private fish installation" does not include any aquaculture
facility or fee fishing facility.
(32) "Private wildlife farm" means an enclosed place where privately
owned birds or furbearers are propagated or kept and which restricts the
birds or furbearers from:
(a) commingling with wild birds or furbearers; and
(b) escaping into the wild.
(33) "Proclamation" means the publication used to convey a statute,
rule, polic}', or pertinent information as it relates to wildlife.
(34) (a) "Protected aquatic wildlife" means aquatic wildlife as defined
in Subsection (3), except as provided in Subsection (b).
(b) "Protected aquatic wildlife" does not include aquatic insects.
(35) (a) "Protected wildlife" means wildlife as defined in Subsection
(49), except as provided in Subsection (b).
(b) "Protected wildlife" does not include coyote, field mouse, gopher,
ground squirrel, jack rabbit, muskrat, and raccoon.
(36) "Released to the wild" means to turn loose from confinement.
(37) (a) "Resident" means a person who:
(i) has been domiciled in the state of Utah for six consecutive
months immediately preceding the purchase of a license; and
(ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing, or trapping in
any other state or country.
(b) A Utah resident retains Utah residency if that person leaves
this state:
(i) to serve in the armed forces of the United States or for
religious or educational purposes; and
(ii) complies with Subsection (a)(ii).
(c) (i) A member of the armed forces of the United States and
dependents are residents for the purposes of this chapter as of the
date the member reports for duty under assigned orders in the
state if the member:
(A) is not on temporary duty in this state; and
(B) complies with Subsection (a)(ii).
(ii) A copy of the assignment orders must be presented to a
wildlife division office to verify the member's qualification as a
resident.
(d) A nonresident attending an institution of higher learning in this
state as a full-time student may qualify as a resident for purposes of
this chapter if the student:
(i) has been present in this state for 60 consecutive days
immediately preceding the purchase of the license; and
(ii) complies with Subsection (a)(ii).
(e) A Utah resident license is invalid if a resident license for
hunting, fishing, or trapping is purchased in any other state or
country.
(f) An absentee landowner paying property tax on land in Utah
does not qualify as a resident.
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(38) "Sell" means to offer or possess for sale, barter, exchange, or trad<\
or the act of selling, bartering, exchanging, or trading.
(39) "Small game" means species of protected wildlife:
(a) commonly pursued for sporting purposes; and
(b) not classified as big game, aquatic wildlife, or furbearers.
(40) "Spoiled" means impairment of the flesh of wildlife which renders
it unfit for human consumption.
(41) "Spotlighting" means throwing or casting the rays of any spotlight,
headlight, or other artificial light on any highway or in any field,
woodland, or forest while having in possession a weapon by which
protected wildlife may be killed.
(42) "Tag" means a card, label, or other identification device issued for
attachment to the carcass of protected wildlife.
(43) "Take" means to:
(a) hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture, possess, angle, seine, trap,
or kill any protected wildlife; or
(b) attempt any action referred to in Subsection (a).
(44) "Threatened" means wildlife designated as such pursuant to Section 3 of the federal Endangered Species Act of 1973.
(45) "Trapping" means taking protected wildlife with a trapping device.
(46) "Trophy animal" means an animal described as follows:
(a) deer — any buck with an outside antler measurement of 24
inches or greater;
(b) elk — any bull with six points on at least one side;
(c) bighorn, desert, or rocky mountain sheep — any ram with a cur)
exceeding half curl;
(d) moose — any bull;
(e) mountain goat — any male or female;
(f) pronghorn antelope — any buck with horns exceeding 14 inches;
or
(g) bison — any bull.
(47) "Waste" means to abandon protected wildlife or to allow protected
wildlife to spoil or to be used in a manner not normally associated with its
beneficial use.
(48) "Water pollution" means the introduction of matter or thermal
energy to waters within this state which:
(a) exceeds state water quality standards; or
(b) could be harmful to protected wildlife.
(49) "Wildlife" means:
(a) crustaceans, including brine shrimp and crayfish;
(b) mollusks; and
(c) vertebrate animals living in nature, except feral animals.
History: C. 1953, 23-13-2, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 2; 1973, ch. 33, § 1; 1975, ch.
60, § 1; 1977, ch. 102, § 1; 1979, ch. 90, § 1;
1981, ch. 112, § 1; 1981, ch. 115, § 1; 1983,
ch. 123, § 1; 1986, ch. 76, § 1; 1991, ch. 5,
§ 31; 1991, ch. 212, § 1; 1992, ch. 27, § 1;
1993, ch. 234, § 15; 1993, ch. 307, § 1; 1994,
ch. 153, $ 29; 1994, ch. 208, § 1; 1995, ch.
211, § 1; 1996, ch. 265, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-

ment by ch. 208, effective May 2, 1994, added
Subsection (1), defining "activity regulated under this title/5 and made related designation
and reference changes, made several stylisticchanges making language gender-neutral, and
corrected an internal reference.
The 1994 amendment by ch. 153, effective
July 3, 3994, added definitions of "aquatic ani
mal," "aquaculture facility," and "fee fishing
facility." renumbering the existing subsections
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uccordingly and making related internal reference changes; added "moJlusk'' to the list of
^aquatic wildlife*'; inserted ^or crayfish" in the
definition of "fishing"; added the (a) designation
in Subsection (30) and added Subsection
(30)(b); and added Subsection (47)(b), redesignating former Subsection (47)(b) as (c) and
making related changes.
The 3995 amendment, effective May 1, 3995,
deleted "or Board of Big Game Control" after
"Wildlife Board" in three places and made a
stylistic change.
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The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1996, added Subsection (46), redesignating the
other subsections accordingly, and in Subsection (35)(a) substituted "Subsection (49)" for
"Subsection (48).*
Federal Law. — Section 3 of the federal
Endangered Species Act of 1973, cited in Subsections (13) and (44), which defines "endangered speciesr and "threatened species," is codified as 16 U.S.C. § 1532.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
State waters.
b a t e r s of this state" meant waters of public
streams of state or water flowing in natural
channels. State v. California Packing Corp., 305

Utah 382, 343 R2d 386 (3943), rehearing denied, 305 Utah 393, 345 R2d 784 (3944) (decided under former similar provisions),

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 3; 38 C.J.S.
Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wildlife § 2.

23-33-3. Wildlife declared property of the state.
All wildlife existing within this state, not held by private ownership and
legally acquired, is the property of the state.
History: C. 3953, 23-13-3, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 3; 1992, ch. 27, § 2.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and
Game § 1.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 2; 38 C.J.S.

Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wildlife § 3.

23-13-4. Captivity of protected wildlife unlawful.
It is unlawful for any person to hold in captivity at any time any protected
wildlife except as provided by this code or rules and regulations of the Wildlife
Board.
History: C. 1953, 23-13-4, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 4.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and
Game § 40.
A.L.R. — Validity, construction, and applica-

tion of state wildlife possession laws, 50
A.L.R.5th 703.

LICENSES, PERMITS AND TAGS
transporting wildlife or taking a deer for a blind
person" from the end of Subsection (2)(a)(ii),
and added Subsection (2Kb).
fishing
The 1998 amendment, effective January 1,
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1999, rewrote Subsection (3) which read "The
Wildlife Board may establish each year a free
day under rules prescribed by the
board."

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and
Game § 45.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish § 36; 38 C.J.S.

Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wildlife § 51 et seq.

23-19-2. License and certificate forms prescribed by Wildlife Board.
(1) The Wildlife Board shall prescribe the form of license or certificate of
registration to be used for hunting, fishing, trapping, seining, and dealing in
furs.
(2) Any license issued pursuant to Section 23-19-36 or 23-19-37 shall be
designated as such by a code number and shall contain no reference to the
licensee's disability.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-2, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 66; 1980, ch. 28, § 3; 1983, ch.
126, § 2; 1996, ch. 145, § 1.

Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment, effective April 29, 1996, added Subsection (2) and made a related change.

23-19-3. Special tags as supplements to licenses and permits.
The division may issue, as supplements to appropriate licenses and permits,
special tags for protected wildlife, as determined by the Wildlife Board.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-3, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 67; 1985, ch. 124, § 1; 1993,
ch. 178, § 2; 1995, ch. 211, § 16.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, deleted "or the
Board of Big Game Control" after "Wildlife
Board."

23-19-4. Alien's right to licenses and certificates.
An alien resident of the State of Utah may purchase hunting, fishing,
trapping, seining, and fur dealer licenses and certificates of registration upon
the same terms as a resident citizen. All nonresident aliens may purchase
hunting, fishing, trapping, seining, and fur dealer licenses and certificates of
registration upon the same terms as nonresident citizens.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-4, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 68; 1980, ch. 28, § 4; 1983, ch.
126, § 3.

23-19-5. Fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in obtaining
a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration unlawful — Violation — Penalty.
It is unlawful for any person to obtain or attempt to obtain a license, permit,
tag. or certificate of registration by fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. It is
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unlawful for a nonresident to purchase a resident license. It is unlawful for a
resident to purchase a nonresident license. Any person violating provisions of
this section is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-5, enacted by L.
3971, ch. 46, § 69; 1975, ch. 60, § 8; 1979, ch.
90, § 6; 1986, ch. 76, § 8.

Cross-Reference6. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

23-19-6. Imitating or counterfeiting license unlawful —
Violation — Penalty.
It is unlawful to imitate or counterfeit any license, permit, tag, or certificate
of registration for the purpose of defrauding the state of Utah or for evading
the purposes and provisions of this code. Any person who violates any provision
of this section is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-6, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 70; 1979, ch. 90, § 7.

Cross-References.— Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

23-19-7. Licenses issued annually — Exception — Expiration date.
The licenses required by this chapter, except lifetime licenses, shall be issued
annually and shall expire on December 31st each year.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-7, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 71; 1973, ch. 33, § 7; 1975, ch.
61, § 1; 1984, ch. 30, § 1.

23-19-8. Signature on documents — Deemed under oath
— Prohibition on use of unsigned documents.
(1) A person's signature on a license, permit, tag, certificate of registration,
or habitat authorization is certification of that person's eligibility to use the
license, permit, tag, certificate of registration, or habitat authorization for the
purpose intended by this title.
(2) The signature need not be notarized but shall be considered to be made
under oath.
(3) A person may not use an unsigned license, permit, tag, certificate of
registration, or habitat authorization.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-8, enacted by L. tag, certificate of registration, or habitat autho1971, ch. 46, § 72; 1976, ch. 60, § 9;l979,ch. rization" in three places, deleted a provision
90, § 8; 1996, ch. 145, § 2.
making violation of the section a misdemeanor,
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- and made several stylistic changes,
ment, effective April 29, 1996 inserted "permit,

23-19-9. Revocation of license — Grounds — Notice —
Restriction on obtaining new license.
(1) A license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration shall be revoked by a
hearing officer appointed by the division director:
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(a) if the hearing officer determines that a person flagrantly and
knowingly:
(i) violates or countenances the violation of:
(A) this title; or
(B) any rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board; or
(ii) while engaged in an activity regulated under this title:
(A) kills or injures domestic livestock; or
(B) violates Section 76-10-508; or
(b) upon receiving notice from another state's wildlife agency that a
person has:
(i) failed to comply with the terms of a wildlife citation; or
(ii) been convicted of a violation that would warrant an action
taken under Subsection (l)(a).
(2) A hearing officer may revoke or suspend the certificate of registration of
a person who fails to comply with the terms of a certificate of registration.
(3) All certificates of registration for the harvesting of brine shrimp eggs, as
defined in Section 59-23-3, shall be revoked by a hearing officer appointed by
the division if the hearing officer determines the holder of the certificates of
registration has violated Section 59-23-5.
(4) The director shall appoint a qualified person as a hearing officer to
perform the adjudicative functions provided in this section. The director may
not appoint a division employee who investigates or enforces wildlife violations.
(5) (a) A hearing officer may not revoke a person's license, permit, tag, or
certificate of registration if:
(i) the person was not charged with a violation in Subsection (1) or
(3);
(ii) the charges were dismissed; or
(iii) the person was found not guilty of the violation in a court of
law.
(b) For purposes of this section, the following shall not be construed as
a finding of not guilty:
(i) a plea of guilty;
(ii) a plea of no contest; or
(iii) the entry of a plea in abeyance.
(6) The hearing officer shall consider any recommendation made by a
sentencing court concerning revocation before issuing a revocation order.
(7) Prior to revocation, a person must be:
(a) given written notice of an action the division intends to take; and
(b) provided with an opportunity for a hearing.
(8) A hearing officer may prohibit the person from obtaining a new license,
permit, tag, or certificate of registration of the same type for a period of up to
five years.
(9) (a) A person may not obtain a new license, permit, tag, or certificate of
registration of the same type while under an order of revocation.
(b) A violation of Subsection (9)(a) is a class B misdemeanor and a
hearing officer shall prohibit the person from obtaining a license, permit,
tag, or certificate of registration of the same type for up to an additional
five years.
(10) A hearing officer may construe any subsequent conviction which occurs
within the revocation period as a flagrant violation and may prohibit the
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person from obtaining a new license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration
for up to an additional five years.
(11) A hearing officer may reinstate a license, permit, tag, or certificate of
registration revoked under Subsection (l)(b)(i) upon receiving a report that the
person has complied with the citation.
(12) (a) A person may file an appeal of a hearing officer's decision with the
Wildlife Board.
(b) The Wildlife Board shall review the hearing officer's findings and
conclusions and any written documentation submitted at the hearing. The
Wildlife Board may:
(i) take no action;
(ii) vacate or remand the decision; or
(iii) amend the period of revocation.
(13) The Wildlife Board may make rules to implement this section in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-9, enacted by L.
1971, ch. 46, § 72; 1983, ch. 126, § 5; 1991,
ch. 212, § 4; 1992, ch. 260, § 1; 1995, ch. 63,
§ 1; 1995, ch. 211, § 17; 1997, ch. 179, § 1;
1998, ch. 13, § 18.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment by ch. 63, effective May 1, 1995, rewrote
this section, substituting the references to the
"hearing officer" for the "Wildlife Board"
throughout, adding Subsections (l)(a)(ii), (2),
(3), (4)(aXi) and (ii), (4Kb), (5), (8), (11), and (12),
and making numerous related and stylistic
changes.
The 1995 amendment by ch. 211, effective

May 1,1995, deleted "or the Board of Big Game
Control" after "Wildlife Board* in Subsection
(l)(a) and made a stylistic change.
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997,
added Subsection (3), redesignating eubsections accordingly; added "or (3)" to the end of
Subsection (5)(a)(i); and substituted "period"for
"number of years'' in Subsection (12XbXiii).
The ^998 amendment, effective May 4, 1998,
substituted "Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative
Rulemaking Act" for "Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act" in Subsection (13).
Cross-References. — Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301.

23-19-9.1. Court-ordered action against a license.
The division shall promptly withhold, suspend, restrict, or reinstate the use
of a license issued under this chapter if so ordered by a court.
History: C. 1953, 23-19-9,1, enacted by L.
1997, ch. 232, § 1.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1997, ch. 232,
§ 142 makes the act effective on July 1, 1997.

23-19-9.5. Warrant outstanding or failure to comply with
citation — Person not entitled to license, permit,
tag, or certificate.
(1) A person may not purchase a license, permit, tag, or certificate of
registration if:
(a) there is an outstanding Utah warrant against him for failure to
appear in answer to a summons for a violation of:
(i) a provision of this title; or
(ii) a rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board; or
(b) he has failed to comply with a wildlife citation in a state which is a
party to the Wildlife Violator Compact set forth in Title 23, Chapter 25.
(2) The division may allow a person referred to in Subsection (1) to purchase
a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration if satisfactory proof is given
that:
662

ENFORCEMENT — VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
State v. Chindgren, 777 P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
Evidence showing that defendant acted recklessly in releasing a falcon in a field full of
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ducks was sufficient to support his conviction
for violating § 23-13-3. State v. Chindgren, 777
P.2d 527 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and
Game §§ 45, 50.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish §§ 29, 36; 38 C.J.S.
Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wildlife §§ 45 to 58, 74 et seq.

A.L.R.— Validity and construction of statute
prohibiting sale within state of skin or body of
specified wild animals or of the animal itself, 44
A.L.R.3d 1008.

23-20-4. Wanton destruction of protected wildlife — Penalties.
(1) A person is guilty of wanton destruction of protected wildlife if he:
(a) commits an act in violation of Section 23-13-4, 23-13-5, 23-13-13,
23-15-6 through 23-15-9, 23-16-5, or Subsection 23-20-3(1);
(b) captures, injures, or destroys protected wildlife; and
(c) (i) does so with intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct as defined
in Section 76-2-103;
(ii) intentionally abandons protected wildlife or a carcass;
(iii) commits the offense at night with the use of a weapon;
(iv) is under a court or division revocation of a license, tag, permit,
or certificate of registration? or
(v) acts for pecuniary gain.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to actions taken which are in accordance
with the following:
(a) Title 4, Chapter 14, Utah Pesticide Control Act;
(b) Title 4, Chapter 23, Agriculture and Wildlife Damage Prevention
Act; or
(c) Section 23-16-3.
(3) Wanton destruction of wildlife is punishable:
(a) as a third degree felony if:
(i) the aggregate value of the protected wildlife determined by the
values in Subsection 23-20-4(4) is more than $500; or
(ii) a trophy animal was captured, injured, or destroyed;
(b) as a class A misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the protected
wildlife, other than any trophy animal, determined by the values established in Subsection 23-20-4(4) is more than $250, but does not exceed
$500;
(c) as a class B misdemeanor if the aggregate value of the protected
wildlife determined by the values established in Subsection 23-20-4(4) is
$250 or less.
(4) Regardless of the restitution amounts imposed under Subsection 23-204.5(2), the following values shall be assigned to protected wildlife for the
purpose of determining the offense for wanton destruction of wildlife:
(a) $1,000 per animal for:
(i) bison;
(ii) bighorn sheep;
(iii) rocky mountain goat;
(iv) moose;
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(v) bear; or
(vi) endangered species;
(b) $750 per animal for:
(i) elk; or
(ii) threatened species;
(c) $500 per animal for:
(i) cougar;
(ii) golden eagle;
(iii) river otter; or
(iv) gila monster;
(d) $400 per animal for:
(i) pronghorn antelope; or
(ii) deer;
(e) $350 per animal for bobcat;
(f) $100 per animal for:
(i) swan;
(ii) sandhill crane;
(iii) turkey;
(iv) pelican;
(v) loon;
(vi) egrets;
(vii) herons;
(viii) raptors, except those that are threatened or endangered;
(ix) Utah milk snake; or
(x) Utah mountain king snake;
(g) $35 per animal for furbearers, except:
(i) bobcat:
(ii) river otter; and
(iii) threatened or endangered species;
(h) $15 per animal for game birds, except:
(i) turkey;
(ii) swan; and
(iii) sandhill crane;
(i) $10 per animal for game fish;
(j) $8 per pound dry weight of processed brine shrimp including eggs;
and
(k) $5 per animal for protected wildlife not listed.
(5) For purposes of sentencing for a wildlife violation, a person who has been
convicted of a third degree felony under Subsection (3)(a) is not subject to the
mandatory sentencing requirements prescribed in Subsection 76-3-203(4).
(6) As part of any sentence imposed, the court shall impose a sentence of
incarceration of not less than 20 consecutive days for any person convicted of
a third degree felony under Subsection (3)(a)(ii) who captured, injured, or
destroyed a trophy animal for pecuniary gain.
(7) If a person has already been convicted of a third degree felony under
Subsection (3)(a)(ii) once, each separate further offense under Subsection
(3)(a)(ii) is punishable by, as part of any sentence imposed, a sentence of
incarceration of not less than 20 consecutive days.
(8) The court may not sentence a person subject to Subsection (6) or (7) to
less than 20 consecutive days of incarceration or suspend the imposition of the
sentence unless the court finds mitigating circumstances justifying lesser
punishment and makes that finding a part of the court record.
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History: C. 1953, 23-20-4, enacted by L.
The 1996 amendment, effective April 29,
1992, ch. 27, § 4; 3 993, ch. 4, § 65; 3 993, ch. 1996, added Subsections OXaXii) and (6) to (8),
178, § 3; 1995, ch. 63, § 2; 1996, ch. 265, § 2. making related changes; in Subsection (3Xb)
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws added "other than any trophy aniinar; in Sub1992, ch. 27, § 4 repeals former § 23-20-4, as section (4) added "gila monster," "Utah milk
last emended by L. 1979, ch. 90, § 11, regard- snake* and "Utah mountain king snake* to the
ing possession of illegally taken protected wild- list of protected wildlife and moved "cougar"
life, and enacts the present section, effective from the list of "$1,000 per animal" to "$500 per
April 27, 1992.
animal"; and made stylistic changes.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendCross-References. — Sentencing for feloment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "divi- nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301.
sion" for "Wildlife Board" in Subsection
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201,
(D(cXiv).
76-3-204, 76-3-301.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Our. 2d. — 35 Am. Jur. 2d Fish and
Game §§ 50, 54.
C.J.S. — 36A C.J.S. Fish §§ 29,42; 38 C.J.S.

Game, Conservation and Preservation of Wildlife §§ 51 to 59, 74 et seq.

23-20-4.5. Illegal taking, possession, or wanton destruction of protected wildlife — Restitution — Reimbursable damages —Assessment by magistrates
— Disposition of monies.
(1) When a person is adjudged guilty of illegal taking, illegal possession, or
wanton destruction of protected wildlife, other than any trophy animal, the
court may order the defendant to pay restitution as set forth in Subsection (2).
or a greater or lesser amount, for the value of each animal taken, possessed, or
destroyed, unless the court finds that restitution is inappropriate.
(2) Suggested minimum restitution values for protected wildlife are as
follows:
(a) $1,000 per animal for:
(i) bison;
(ii) bighorn sheep;
(iii) rocky mountain goat;
(iv) moose;
(v) bear; or
(vi) endangered species;
(b) $750 per animal for:
(i) elk; or
(ii) threatened species;
(c) $500 per animal for:
(i) cougar;
(ii) golden eagle;
(iii) river otter; or
(iv) gila monster;
(d) $400 per animal for:
(i) pronghorn antelope; or
(ii) deer;
(e) $350 per animal for bobcat;
(f) $100 per animal for:
(i) swan;
(ii) sandhill crane;
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(2) This section does not prohibit an agency from designating by rule the
names or titles of the agency head or the presiding officers with responsibility
for adjudicative proceedings before the agency.
History: C. ]953, 63-46b-2, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 361, S 258; 1988, eh. ]69, § 42.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 R2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

63-46b-3. Commencement of adjudicative proceedings.
(1) Except as otherwise permitted by Section 63-46b-20, all adjudicative
proceedings shall be commenced by either:
(a) a notice of agency action, if proceedings are commenced by the
agency; or
(b) a request for agency action, if proceedings are commenced by
persons other than the agency.
(2) A notice of agency action shall be filed and served, according to the
following requirements:
(a) The notice of agency action shall be in writing, signed by a presiding
officer, and shall include:
(i) the names and mailing addresses of all persons to whom notice
is being given by the presiding officer, and the name, title, and mailing
address of any attorney or employee who has been designated to
appear for the agency;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(iii) the name of the adjudicative proceeding:
(iv) the date that the notice of agency action was mailed;
(v) a statement of whether the adjudicative proceeding is to be
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules adopted
under Sections 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, or formally according to the
provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(vi) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, a statement that
each respondent must file a written response within 30 days of the
mailing date of the notice of agency action;
(vii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing is
required by statute or rule, a statement of the time and place of any
scheduled hearing, a statement of the purpose for which the hearing
is to be held, and a statement that a party who fails to attend or
participate in the hearing may be held in default;
(viii) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal and a hearing
is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted by rule and
may be requested by a party within the time prescribed by rule, a
statement that the parties may request a hearing within the time
provided by the agency's rules;
(ix) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which
the adjudicative proceeding is to be maintained;
(x) the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the
presiding officer; and
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(xi) a statement of the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding and,
to the extent known by the presiding officer, the questions to be
decided,
(b) When adjudicative proceedings are commenced by the agency, the
agency shall:
(i) mail the notice of agency action to each party;
(ii) publish the notice of agency action, if required by statute; and
(iii) mail the notice of agency action to any other person who has a
right to notice under statute or rule.
(3) (a) Where the law applicable to the agency permits persons other than
the agency to initiate adjudicative proceedings, that person's request for
agency action shall be in writing and signed by the person invoking the
jurisdiction of the agency, or by his representative, and shall include:
(i) the names and addresses of all persons to whom a copy of the
request for agency action is being sent;
(ii) the agency's file number or other reference number, if known;
(iii) the date that the request for agency action was mailed;
(iv) a statement of the legal authority and jurisdiction under which
agency action is requested;
(v) a statement of the relief or action sought from the agency; and
(vi) a statement of the facts and reasons forming the basis for relief
or agency action.
(b) The person requesting agency action shall file the request with the
agency and shall send a copy by mail to each person known to have a direct
interest in the requested agency action.
(c) An agency may, by rule, prescribe one or more printed forms eliciting
the information required by Subsection (3)(a) to serve as the request for
agency action when completed and filed by the person requesting agency
action.
(d) The presiding officer shall promptly review a request for agency
action and shall:
(i) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is granted
and that the adjudicative proceeding is completed;
(ii) notify the requesting party in writing that the request is denied
and, if the proceeding is a formal adjudicative proceeding, that the
party may request a hearing before the agency to challenge the denial;
or
(iii) notify the requesting party that further proceedings are required to determine the agency^s response to the request.
(e) (i) Any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) shall contain the
information required by Subsection 63-46b-5(l)(i) in addition to
disclosure required by Subsection (3)(d)(ii) of this section.
(ii) The agency shall mail any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)
to all parties, except that any notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii)
may be published when publication is required by statute.
(iii) The notice required by Subsection (3)(d)(iii) shall:
(A) give the agency's file number or other reference number;
(B) give the name of the proceeding;
(C) designate whether the proceeding is one of a category to be
conducted informally according to the provisions of rules enacted
nnHpr Rprtions 63-46b-4 and 63-46b-5, with citation to the appli-
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cable rule authorizing that designation, or formally according to
the provisions of Sections 63-46b-6 to 63-46b-ll;
(D) in the case of a formal adjudicative proceeding, and where
respondent parties are known, state that a written response must
be filed within 30 days of the date of the agency's notice if mailed,
or within 30 days of the last publication date of the agency's
notice, if published;
(E) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be formal, or if a hearing
is to be held in an informal adjudicative proceeding, state the
time and place of any scheduled hearing, the purpose for which
the hearing is to be held, and that a party who fails to attend or
participate in a scheduled and noticed hearing may be held in
default;
(F) if the adjudicative proceeding is to be informal, and a
hearing is required by statute or rule, or if a hearing is permitted
by rule and may be requested by a party within the time
prescribed by rule, state the parties' right to request a hearing
and the time within which a hearing may be requested under the
agency's rules; and
(G) give the name, title, mailing address, and telephone number of the presiding officer.
(4) When initial agency determinations or actions are not governed by this
chapter, but agency and judicial review of those initial determinations or
actions are subject to the provisions of this chapter, the request for agency
action seeking review must be filed with the agency within the time prescribed
by the agency's rules.
(5) For designated classes of adjudicative proceedings, an agency may, by
rule, provide for a longer response time than allowed by this section, and may
provide for a shorter response time if required or permitted by applicable
federal law.
(6) Unless the agency provides otherwise by rule or order, applications for
licenses filed under authority of Title 32A, Chapters 3, 4, and 5, are not
considered to be a request for agency action under this chapter.
(7) If the purpose of the adjudicative proceeding is to award a license or
other privilege as to which there are multiple competing applicants, the agency
may, by rule or order, conduct a single adjudicative proceeding to determine the
award of that license or privilege.
History: C. 3 953, 63-46b-3, enacted by
1987, ch. 361, § 259; 1988, ch. 72, § 36.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
statute as adopted by the legislature, not an
agency's rules as adopted by the agency.
Nielson v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. &
Training, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

ANALYSIS

Applicable law.
Defect in notice.
—Waiver.
Dismissal.
Presiding officer.

Defect in notice.

Applicable law.
The reference to "law applicable" in Subsection (3)(a) is a reference to an agency's enabling

— Waiver.
Motorist's failure to object to the manner of
notice or type of hearing at the beginning of a
driver's license suspension hearing, when he
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<>3-46b-8. Pj~ocedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal
.idjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties
reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly
repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the
original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is
hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit
rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at
the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential
information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
History: C. 3 953, 63-46b-8, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 264; 1988, ch. 72, § 19.
Cross-References. — Judicial notice. Utah
K. Evid. 201.

Privileges. Utah R. Evid. 501 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cross-examination.
Agency decision revoking social worker's license was reversed and his case was remanded
lor a new hearing, because the failure to afford
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-

nesses against him resulted in "substantial
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational &
Professional Licensing. 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989.
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76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negligence or criminally negligent."
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
History: C. 3 953, 76-2-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
nary negligence, which is the basi6 for a civil
action for damages, is not sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford,
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988).

ANALYSIS

Criminal negligence.
— Expert testimony.
Malice.

Proof of intent and malice.
Recklessness.
Willfulness.
Cited.
Criminal negligence.
The bending down of a stop sign at an interaction so that it was not visible to traffic was
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980).
The sole difference between reckless manflu ughter and negligent homicide is whether
tin- defendant actually knew of the risk of death
tn was not, but should have been, aware of it. In
tx>th cases, a defendant's conduct must be a
'l'ro6F deviation" from the standard of care
rM-rcised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-
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—Expert testimony.
While expert testimony is not required to
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant
accused of homicide, expert testimony i6 required where criminal negligence is alleged and
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden,
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reVd on
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant
physician's trial for negligent homicide involving the death of an infant after a premature
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds,
813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991).
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R657-26. Adjudicative Proceedings for a License, Permit, Tag, or Certificate
of Registration.
R657-26-1. Purpose and Authority.
R657-26-2. Definitions.
R657-26-3. Commencement of Revocation Proceedings.
R657-26-4. Procedures for Revocation and Suspension Proceedings.
R657-26-5. Hearings.
R657-26-6. Issuance of Decision and Order.
R657-26-7. Default.
R657-26-8. Wildlife Board Review - Procedure.
R657-26-9. Reinstatement of a License, Permit, Tag, or Certificate of Registration.
R657-26-1. Purpose and Authority.
Under authority of Subsection 23-19-9(12), this rule provides the procedures and standards
for:
(1) the revocation of a license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration; and
(2) the suspension of a certificate of registration.
R657-26-2. Definitions.
(1) Terms used in this rule are defined in Section 23-13-2.
(2) In addition:
(a) "Flagrantly" means an act in violation of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code committed in
a manner that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, is conspicuously bad or offensive.
(b) "Knowingly" means, with respect to the nature or the result of a person's conduct, that
the person was aware, or should have been aware, that the conduct was reasonably certain to
cause the result.
(c) "Party" means the division, Wildlife Board, or respondent.
(d) "Presiding officer" means the hearing officer appointed by the division director to
conduct revocation or suspension proceedings.
(e) "Respondent" means a person against whom a revocation proceeding is initiated.
R657-26-3. Commencement of Revocation Proceedings.
(l)(a) Each adjudicative proceeding shall be commenced by the presiding officer by filing a
notice of agency action.
(2) The notice of agency action shall be filed and served according to the requirements
provided in Section 63-46b-3(2).
(3) All revocation and suspension proceedings conducted by the presiding officer are
designated as informal adjudications. The presiding officer may convert the hearing to a formal
hearing anytime before a final order is issued if:
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc , and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc All Rights Reserved
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(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.
R657-26-4. Procedures for Revocation and Suspension Proceedings.
(l)(a) An answer or other pleading responsive to the allegations in the notice of agency
action does not need to be filed by the respondent.
(b) If an answer to the notice of agency action is filed, the answer shall include:
(i) the name of the respondent;
(ii) the case number or other reference number:
(iii) the facts surrounding the allegations;
(iv) a response to the allegations that the violation was committed knowingly and flagrantly;
and
(v) the date the answer was mailed.
(2) The respondent may access any information contained in the division's files and all
materials and information gathered in any investigation of the respondent, to the extent permitted
by law.
(3) Discovery and intervention is prohibited.
R657-26-5. Hearings.
(l)(a) The presiding officer shall provide the respondent with an opportunity for a hearing,
(b) A hearing shall be held if the respondent requests a hearing within 20 days after the date
the notice of agency action is issued.
(2) The respondent, or a person designated by the respondent to appear on the respondent's
behalf, may testify at the hearing and present any relevant information or evidence.
(3) Hearings shall be open to all parties to the proceeding.
(4) After reviewing all of the information provided by the parties, the presiding officer shall
revoke the respondent's license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration if:
(a) the presiding officer determines that the respondent flagrantly and knowingly:
(i) violated or countenanced the violation of any:
(A) provision of Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code; or
(B) rule, proclamation, or order of the Wildlife Board; or
(ii) while engaged in any activity regulated under Title 23, Wildlife Resources Code:
(A) kills or injures domestic livestock; or
(B) violates Section 76-10-508; or
(b) upon receiving notification from another state's wildlife agency that a person has:
(i) failed to comply with the terms of a wildlife citation;
(ii) been convicted' of a violation that would warrant an action taken under Subsection (a); or
(c) the person violated Section 23-20-14.
(5) After reviewing all of the information provided by the parties, the presiding officer may
revoke or suspend the certificate of registration of a person who fails to comply with the terms of
a certificate of registration.
(6)(a) The presiding officer may not revoke a person's license, permit, tag, or certificate of
registration if:
(i) the person was not charged with a violation in Subsection (4);
(ii) the charges were dismissed; or
(iii) the person was found not guilty of the violation in a court of law.
(b) For purposes of this section, the following shall not be construed as a finding of not
guilty:
(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. All Rights Reserved.

i;2
(i) a plea of guilty;
(ii) a plea of no contest; or
(Hi) the entry of a plea in alu
2.
(7) -The presiding, officer SLM v insider any recommendatioi 1 made by a sentencii ig cot 11: t
concerning revocation before issuing a revocation order.
R657-26-6.

ISSIIJIIIIT

of Decision 11 nil Order,

(1) Within a reasonable time after the close c; .,u ..djudieaiive proceeding, the presiding
officer shall issue a signed, written order that stated
(a) the decision;
(b) the reasons for the decision;
(c) a notice of any right of adminii,aa!;vL o; j J i , u u , , , u , > ..
1
(d) the time limits for filing an appeal or requesting a review.
H^ Thi decision and order shall be based on facts appearing in divisic:
.m in (In,
iLi u>nv and facts presented in evidence at the hearing.
(3) A copy of the decision and order shall be promptly mailed to all parties.
R657-26-7. Default.
(1) The presiding officer may enter an order of default against the respondent if 1:1le
respondent fails to participate, either in writing or in person, in the adjudicative proceeding.
(2) Upon issuing the order of default, the presiding officer shall complete the adjudicative
proceeding without participation of the party in default and shall:
(a) include a statement of the grounds for default;
(b) make a finding of all relevant issues required in Sections R657-26-5(4) or (5); and
(c) mail a copy of the order to all parties.
(3)(a) A defaulted party may seek to have the preMumr oiinei set aside the default order, and
any order in the adjudicative proceeding issued suhsequctit to such default, by following the
procedures outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
l
(b) A motion to set and- -» ^• r -r ,< - V;„
^sequent jfdt:
.ade to the
presiding officer.
(c) A defaulted part\ may seek Wildlife hoard Review under Section R657-26-S oni^
j
decision of the pr^'idim- <JXw •• * 'be m< -\ o? io set aside the default.
R657-26-8. Wildlife Board Review - Procedure.
(l)(a) A person may file an appeal of a presiding office; N decision with the Wildlife board
(b) The appeal must be in writing and the respondent --IMII --end a copy of the appeal by mail
to the chair of the Wildlife Board and each of the parties.
(2) The appeal must be filed within 30 days after the issuance oi the presidii ig Dfficei fs
decision and order.
(3) The appeal shall:
(a) be signed by the respondent or the respondent's legal .*>•-•
(b) state the grounds for appeal and the relief requested; an*
(c) state the date upon which it was mailed.
(4)(a) Within 15 days after the mailing dn
response with the Wildlife Board
(b) A copy of the response shall tx ^ m U mail 10 the chair of the \\ udlife Board a
of the parties.
(5) The Wildlife Board shall ;
i formal heanpi:
;K cordrmc* *i !tb the pnn;
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Section 63-46b-6 through Section 63-46b-10. The Wildlife Board may convert the hearing to an
informal hearing anytime before a final order is issued if:
(a) conversion of the proceeding is in the public interest; and
(b) conversion of the proceeding does not unfairly prejudice the rights of any party.
(6) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Wildlife Board may:
(a) take no action;
(b) vacate or remand the decision; or
(c) amend the duration of revocation or suspension ordered by the presiding officer.
(7)(a) If the Wildlife Board takes any action to vacate or remand the decision or amend the
duration of revocation or suspension, the chair of the Wildlife Board shall, within a reasonable
time, issue a written order on review.
(b) The order on review shall be signed by the chair of the Wildlife Board and mailed to each
party.
(c) The order on review shall contain:
(i) a designation of the statute permitting review;
(ii) a statement of the issues reviewed;
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues reviewed;
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of the issues reviewed;
(v) whether the decision of the presiding officer is to be affirmed, reversed, modified, and
whether all or any portion of the adjudicative proceeding is to be remanded;
(vi) a notice of any right of further administrative reconsideration or judicial review; and
(vii) the time limits applicable to any appeal or review.
(8) Any review of a presiding officer's decision shall be strictly limited to the matter
specified in the order.
R657-26-9. Reinstatement of a License, Permit, Tag, or Certificate of Registration.
(1) A presiding officer may reinstate a person's license, permit, tag, or certificate of
registration revoked under Subsection 23-19-9(1 )(b)(i) upon receiving a written request for
reinstatement.
(2) The person making the request shall include:
(a) the person's name, phone number, and mailing address;
(b) the number of the license, permit, tag, or certificate of registration that was revoked;
(c) the date the violation occurred;
(d) the date the request was mailed;
(e) the state in which the violation occurred;
(!) a copy of a receipt from the court where the violation was processed stating the violation
is no longer outstanding; and
(g) the person's signature.
(3) Within a reasonable time of receiving the request, the presiding officer shall issue a
written order stating whether the request is granted or denied and the reasons for the decision.
(4) If a presiding officer denies a person's request for reinstatement, the person may submit a
request for reconsideration by following the procedures provided in Section 63-46b-13.
References: 23-13-2, 23-14-1, 23-14-19, 23-19-9, 23-20-14, 63-46b-13, 67-46b-5.
History: 11718, NEW. 06/01/91: 12752. AMD. 06/15/92; 16884, AMD, 06/14/95; 17439,
AMD, 01/16/96; 17936, AMD, 09/09/96; 18313, 5YR, 11/15/96; 18581, AMD, 03/18/97.

(c) 1999 by LEXIS Law Publishing, a division of Reed Elsevier Inc., and Reed Elsevier Properties Inc. AH Rights Reserved.

ADDENDUM C

S I ATE OF UTAH
•EPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES

In the Matter of the Peimit of:
Joseph Bradbury, Respondent
to Harvest Protected Wildlife in the
State of Utah

1.

)
)
)
.) '

NOTJCE OF AGENCY ACTION
Case No. 98-0752

This Notice of Agency Action is to inform Respondent that the Utah Division Of

Resources is commencing an adjudicative proceeding to consider the revocation, and 'or
suspension of Respondent's privileges to harvest protected will llife ii i the State of I Jli il I Ill: I

tin >n

is initialed as an informal adjudicative proceeding under the jurisdictional and procedural aiitlioi it)
c

2.

The Division alleys that on December 15, 1999, Respondent plead gi lilt] ' and was

convicted in tl le Uii itali Cc mnty Justice Coui t c >f violating Utah Code A nn § 23-20 -4, a Class A
,!(]

Misdemeanor, Criminal Case Nuinbei

'''ir'M

Respondent shot and killed a bull « Ik

Non-resident Limited Entry Book Cliffs Elk K »

\\ 5 i.; II.LI alleged that Respondent knowingly aiid flag]aiitl> committed the acts that resulted in the
aforementioned u .- *,

i.

"L_—Z!? e - "*'''" * r]

^"~ i 1 '

,ALvllll

£?

iS l u l k u r n

" ; ' l i : -vliLiiiu ii.L la^.o u,»uunm t the

criminal conviction were conimitted knowingly and flap ,;nil\. Ir tlis; I hvision determines that the
illegal acts were co;i n n litted knowingly and flagranti} h.- ;i> u \ oke any wi kiine licenses or permits
tllat Respondent currently holds <

\

4.

Respondent is entitled to request a hearing before the Division to contest the

allegations in the Notice of Agency Action. The request for hearing must be made in writing and
received by the Division no later than 20 days from the date this notice is issued. If Respondent fails
to request a hearing or otherwise fails to respond to the Notice of Agency Action within 20 days, an
order of default judgement will be entered revoking Respondent's privileges to harvest protected
wildlife in the State of Utah.
5.

Upon receiving a request for hearing or a response to the Notice of Agency Action,

the Division will schedule a date and time for a hearing where Respondent will have the opportunity
to testify, call witnesses, and present evidence in his behalf. Respondent's personal attendance at the
hearing will be required where Respondent can either represent himself or employ the services of
a legal advisor. Following the hearing, the Division will issue a written decision and order detailing
the legal and factual rationale for the decision.
6.

The Division will provide Respondent, upon request, any information and documents

in its files relevant to this proceeding and to the extent permitted by law.
7.

Pursuant to the Wildlife Violator Compact, Title 23, Chapter 5 of the Utah Code, any

order revoking or suspending Respondent's privileges to harvest protected wildlife in Utah may be
given reciprocal recognition in the following states: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.
8.

AH written pleadings and communications concerning this Notice of Agency Action

shall be identified by the case name and number reflected in the caption of this notice, and directed
to Debbie Sundell, Utah Division of Wildlife Resources, 1594 West North Temple,

S.ill II jiki
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III l ' i ' | i i i i i i i l t i i l lllri^ a:i ir; in: lfoi i i lati : n :: i a

statement that should be reviewed pi io? \c the hearing, he should submit that inibnnatioii to the
Division at the above address so that it i :i lay be considered and i nade a part of the record
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Di\ :iioi. ol Wildlife Resources

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that on the 29thday of June, 2000,1 caused to be delivered by certified mail, return
receipt requested, a true and correct copy of the attached Notice of Agency Action addressed to the
following person(s):
Joseph Bradbury
4606 North 50 West
Provo UT 84601

Valerie Westphal
*
Executive Secretary
Division of Wildlife Resources

STATE OF l I'M 11
DEPARTMENT OF NATIIRA I, Kl SOURCES
WILDLIFE I" »A»P
)

Joseph J. Bradbury,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, DIVISION
OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES

ORDER

Case No.
Respondent.

KGROI sc»
* I 1 I

' I V

i % I

t J

! \

1 i 1

ml iiijjjunj ii.ih-i ht iiiiiL in the above-captioned

inatler on Mav
Salt Lake City, Utan. Hoard members Collin Allan. Ra\ mond Heaton. Paul Nu-meyer OsrnllMMiiiji IIK ndla I iu lii-ui ( urn lliunl^ s .null 11,111 man \\ la,- IMOIJJ.HI M l ) were presei it

4 11

participated in and unanimously agreed to the decision. The Board conducted the formal Iiear
under provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, I Jtah Division of Wildlife
Nrsnini i s ("I )\Vh' ' I Minim in iili i I-'mli1

i I i iillii i ,i|i|i|ii illilii Ihiv.

Assistant Attorney Genual Martin bu^luian represented DWR at the Hearing. Appellant
Joseph 13i adbury was represented by his attorney,, Robert C. Fillerup.
h W I M M f i n I (.1(1 ' I n p l h i i i i l r ' l i T i n l

m 1 K/! mil if film I M

testified on his own behalf \
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,
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After hearing from all parlies, receiving full disclosure of relevant facts, reviewing submitted
exhibits, and considering the evidence and relevant law, the Board hereby makes the following
findings of fact and conclusions of law, offers reasons for its decisions, and issues the order below.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. Joseph Bradbury is a resident of Utah and he is domiciled in Utah.

Mr. Bradbury

admitted before the Board and Judge Anderson that he is a resident of Utah. He currently resides
at 4606 North 50 West, Provo, Utah, and he has lived in Utah for at least fourteen years. Mr.
Bradbury claims Utah residency for business, tax and voting purposes.
2. Mr. Bradbury has never been a legal resident of Idaho.
3. In November of 1993, Joseph Bradbury traveled to Meridian, Idaho, and obtained an
Idaho driver's license.
4. Mr. Bradbury obtained the Idaho driver's license using the following address: 1524
Meridian Street, Meridian, Idaho. This address is that of the Almost Home Day Care Center, owned
by Mr. Bradbury's sister. Joseph Bradbury has never lived at this address.
5. From 1993 to 1998, Joseph Bradbury obtained Idaho resident hunting licenses using the
Idaho address of the Almost Home Day Care Center.
6. In 1996, Joseph Bradbury applied for a nonresident hunting license in Utah. On the
application, Mr. Bradbury listed 1524 Meridian Street, Meridian, Idaho, as his address and signed
a statement attesting that all information contained in the application was "true and correct."
7. In 1997, Joseph Bradbury applied for and obtained a Utah nonresident limited entry Book
Cliffs Elk Permit. He again listed the Meridian, Idaho address of his sister's day care center as his
address and signed the application, indicating that all statements therein were "true and correct." Mr.
2

Bradbury coi ui ••*!•* be uiiLJiL*; o. *,.; .-. . M .
»' in nhr I.ill nl fWN rin .inuiivinous caller contacted DWR Officer Jack Tophani *
the agency's hotline and i eporied that Mr. Bradbury 1 lad ui ilawfully obtained a Utah nonresident
1 luntii ig license foi the past five years
jjadbury shot a six-poii it bull elk ostensibl) ui idei
autl lority of the nonresident limited entry Book Cliffs Bull Elk Permit.
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On Septembci w , <.

>* ^^dbury was i.

i

iiiiii,in, IiJiiIi" , ne count of purchasing *;K, l vviong class license" foi huntm^ , •<

hnii- :

v nuni ui purchasing. n»« ' vTong class tag" for elk, and one count of purchasing the "wrong class tag"
,ree ronv,

A,

bident

hunting licenses. As a iwo«..,,-«. iiiadbui) i Idaho hunting pmiktu^ u c t icvoktd lor a period
of I wo years.
bury pled (.Minify at a hearing in the Eighth District
Court. I mstah County, Utah, io a * u»lation of Utah Code Annotated § 23-20-4, "wanton destn iction
of wildlife, " a I. law A MjMk.ncanu.

I lit u i . 1 . I

i1 lu < ,1

I L I'ni Hi 'i, liil hi m \ \\ini\\

I I I I ll< \ ill i i unlawfully obtained Utah nonresident lii i lited entry Book Cliffs Bull Elk Pern lit in
1997 Defendant was represented at the hearing by his coi insci
CI il\l I Ii1* U iI'M I I i

I
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-

* orr ^t!
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13. Utah Code Annotated § 23-19-9 requires that a w i 1111 i Ie 1 icense, permit, or tag be revoked
if a person "flagrantly and k now ing'y, violates...,th[e] title."
I

>Mh .'iliiinii «u"'

• l«,lll«\/'Jll!hJliI!)| i) il< Inn •• Il.it'i.mllv

In mr.m

1 illf ?":i committed in a manner that...is coi ispicuousiy bad oi offensive."
3

in u ( in

15. Utah Administrative Code R657-26-2(2)(b) defines "knowingly" to mean "with respect
to the nature or the result of a person's conduct, that the person was aware, or should have been
aware, that the conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result."
16. Utah Code Annotated § 23-19-5 makes it unlawful for any person to "obtain a license,
permit, tag . . . by fraud, deceit or misrepresentation

(i)t is unlawful for a resident to purchase

a nonresident license."
17. Utah Code Annotated § 23-13-2(36) defines "resident" as "a person who: (i) has been
domiciled in the state of Utah for six consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a
license; and (ii) does not claim residency for hunting, fishing or trapping in any other state or
country."
18. Utah Code Annotated § 23-20-4 provides that a person is guilty of "wanton destruction
of protected wildlife" if he "posess[es] protected wildlife . . . unaccompanied by a valid . . . tag."
19. Utah Code Annotated § 23-13-2(34)(a) defines "protected wi ldlife" to include "vertebrate
animals living in nature, except feral animals."
20. Based upon the testimony and exhibits presented by both parties at the hearing, and
taking into account the DWR Hearing Officer's previous order relating to this case, the Board finds
that Mr. Bradbury was a Utah resident for the purpose of hunting. Utah Code Annotated § 23-132(36) defines "resident" as "a person who: (i) has been domiciled in the state of Utah for six
consecutive months immediately preceding the purchase of a license; and (ii) does not claim
residency for hunting, fishing or trapping in any other state or country." Mr. Bradbury admits that
he meets the definition's first criteria because he was domiciled in Utah for six consecutive months
immediately before purchasing his license. However, he argues that he did not meet the second
4

criteria because he claimed residency in Idaho for hi inting, fishing, or trapping purposes, i u: in :i,
thertlou m ^ <•• Iii Mi \ cinhri iif 1 *KH Joseph Bradbury traveled to Meridian, Idaho and obtained an Idaho
driver's license ihsmg ihc address of his sister's business located in Meridian, Idahi
has never Ih id .
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On September 2 3, 1000 Mi
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a license for hunting, fishing, and trapping.
21.

The Board concludes that Mr. Bradbury knowingly and flagrantly violated Utah Code

Ann. §23-19-5:
(a) the Board concludes the violation occurred "knowingly" because the evidence
presented to the Board demonstrates that Mr. Bradbury knew he was a resident of Utah in
1996 and 1997, but he applied for and obtained a nonresident hunting license and permit.
Joseph Bradbury is domiciled in Utah. He currently resides at 4606 North 50 West, Provo,
Utah, and he has lived in Utah for at least fourteen years. Mr. Bradbury claims Utah
residency for business, tax and voting purposes and he has never lived in Idaho.
(b) the Board determines the violation occurred "flagrantly," or in a conspicuously bad
or offensive manner, because:
(1) Mr. Bradbury misrepresented his residence by listing the Idaho address
of the Almost Home Day Care Center as his address on his 1997 application
for a nonresident limited entry Book Cliffs Elk Permit. Mr. Bradbury has
never lived in Idaho. Mr. Bradbury signed a statement on the application
indicating that this information was "true and correct," when he knew in fact
that it was a misrepresentation.
(2) Mr. Bradbury was prosecuted and convicted in an Idaho court for
purchasing an Idaho resident hunting license and tags, indicating that he
obtained the license and tags in an unlawful manner and that he was not a
resident of Idaho;
(3) Mr. Bradbury was prosecuted and convicted in Utah of wanton
6
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ORDER
H.if.td upon the foi egoing, and in a c c o r d a n c e nilli I ii.ih < mil, • • 11M•< Mi il (, J * HI

' \

i

iioaid actions
The Hearing Officer's J a n u a i y 2 5 200 \ Oei ;>>ion and O r d e r suspending J o s e p h J.
Bradbury's hunting privileges for a period of five years is ^, i u M C
hunting puvileges are suspi IMM M M

<
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•
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, ;

N o v e m b e i 2 9 , ^uuO, and

ending November 28, 2005.
(2)

During this suspension period, Mr. Bradbury may not obtain or possess any hunting

license issued by the State of Utah. Any Utah hunting license obtained during this period is invalid.
(3)

Mr. Bradbury is hereby notified that this Order is given reciprocal recognition by all

states participating in the Wildlife Violator Compact, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Maryland,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming.
(4)

Mr. Bradbury is also notified that if he commits a wildlife-related violation during

the suspension period, such violation will, by definition, be considered knowing and flagrant and
could lead to a suspension of hunting privileges for an additional five years.

DATED this c^k

Max Morgan, M . D .
Board Chair

8

day of September, 2001.

M

NOTICE
In accordance with Utah Code Annotated § 63-46b-l 3, Appellant may seek reconsideration
of this Order within 20 days from the issue date. The request must be made in writing to Dr. Max
Morgan, Wildlife Board Chairman, 1594 West North TYmple, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0855.
,,K
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'
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' »" ^ u : e d gn,u.,ds for reconsideration, and

contain the date of mailing.
Appellant may seek judicial review of this order in district court by filing a petition for
judicial review within 30 days of the date of this Order, i„ accordance with Utah Code Annotated
§§ 63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, and other applicable law.
h
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
MAILIINU^^
I, ^ ~ ~ £ - "frp'frfr certify that on the
day of September, 2001, I placed in the United
States Mail, postage prepaid, copies of the attached Order addressed to:
Joseph J. Bradbury
4606 N. 50 W.
Provo,UT 84601
Robert C. Fillerup
Attorney at Law
1107S. OremBlvd
Orem, UT 84058
Martin Bushman
Assistant Attorney General
1594 West North Temple, # 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116
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